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INTRODUCTION
What you could'a done instead was show me the Point of Pitts-
burgh. You could'a told me Spelman College was made for smart
black folks like me. You could'a helped me complete my college
applications. You could'a taken me fishing or to Africa. You
could'a shown me any college campus. You could'a come to hear
Third-year law student at Cleveland-Marshall College of Law.
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me sing, or read my poems, essays, or short stories with delight.
You could'a watched me graduate with honors. You could'a taught
me to make cracklin' bread. You could'a held me close, called me
Beloved, and that's all. You could a let me know Baldwin, Mal-
colm, Haley at your knee. You could'a let me watch you work.
You could'a listened, advised, fussed, admonished, chastised,
bragged, comforted, cajoled, encouraged, or inspired me. You
could'a done anything, anything, anything at all instead of fucking1
me.
This paper explores the meanings and implications of sodomy
represented in American jurisprudence through common law,
common sense, nonsense, and constitutional interpretation. Specifi-
cally, Deconstructing Sodomy exposes the impact of sodomy laws on the
rights of lesbigay citizens. However, Deconstructing Sodomy is not the
usualjoumaled exploration of legal analysis. More than mere legal
analysis, I intend this paper to be multidisciplinary. It includes po
litical analysis and explores the politics of the everyday lives of peo-
ple classified by sexual orientation. Moreover, Deconstructing Sodomy
is not a solipsistic4 discussion of supposed universal" lesbigay interests
1. LESLYE M. HUFF, What You Could'a Done Instead, in BLACK LESIANS Do NOT EXIsT 24
(1995) (Unpublished manuscript on file with the author at P.O. Box 93644, Cleveland, OH
44101).
2. When referring generally to lesbians, to bisexual men or women, and to gay men, I
have chosen to use the term "lesbigay" for its ease and at least partial collectivity. It is only par-
dally collective since it does not expressly include our transgender community. I apologize to
the transgender community for my lag in developing a more completely inclusive term; it will
come.
3. Another student, Melissa Dean, and I co-presented a preliminary draft of this work at
John Marshall Law School's Sex, Law, Society, Interdiscplinary Conference - The Tenth Anniversary of
Bowers v. Hardwick, March 14-16, 1996. The conference afforded scholars the opportunity to
present their work in an integrative context. Many of the presentations at the conference syn-
thesized the information gleaned from a variety of disciplines to speak of law within a context of
our lives as a whole. I would like to acknowledge the important contribution that Melissa Dean
made to the creation of this paper. Members of our newly-formed LesBiGay Law Students As-
socation entertained the notion attending this conference. Because of fear of homophobic
retaliation, most of the students from our organization did not attend the conference. How-
ever, Melissa remained actively supportive as I envisioned not only attending the conference,
but also offering a formal presentation on a panel at the conference. Melissa drafted a section
titled "Privacy, Prerogative, and Privilege." I conceptualized, researched, and drafted the re-
maining sections. I have made substantive changes in the text, including the "Privacy, Preroga-
tive, and Privilege" section. Therefore, the published text is quite different than the prelimi-
nary draft that we originally presented. The personal voice represented in both text and notes
is my own. I use my voice to clarify, to amplify, or to proclaim. I have used the personal pro-
noun "I to indicate that I am speaking for myself only as I wrestle with my own aporia. I take
full responsibility or blame for all sections of this text as it stands or sits today. But of course,
the text is changing even as you read it; such is the life of the deconstructed text.
4. WEBsER'S NEv WORLD DIGrIoNARY OF AMERICAN ENGLISH 1276 (3rd college ed.
1988). This term is based on the theory of solipsism, meaning that "the self can be aware of
nothing but its own experiences and states" and is the only thing really existent. Id.
5. SeeADRIENNERICH, ON LIES, SECRETS, AND SILENCE 299-310 (1979). First, Rich defines
"white solipsism: To think, imagine, and speak as if whiteness described the world." Id. at 299.
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unrelated to any factors of existence other than sexual orientation.
The parallels and intersections that exist between racism, genderism,
6
ageism, classism, and heterosexism are not ignored, although the
scope of the work is limited by time and expertise. Deconstructing
Sodomy is a call to decipher the multifaceted components of a domi-
nating culture for the sake ofjustice.
As a pattern of discrimination, heterosexism pervades most dimen-
sions of our cultural life. This system shapes our legal, economic,
political, social, interpersonal, familial, historical, educational, and
ecclesial institutions. Heterocentrism lies at the heart of this system
of prejudice. Heterocentrism leads to the conviction that hetero-
sexuality is the normative form of human sexuality. It is the meas-
ure by which all other sexual orientations are judged. All sexual
authority, value, and power are centered in heterosexuality.
7
Racism is useful as an analogue for a fully developed and pervasive
mode of abuse and oppression. The habit of domination was per-
fected in the United States in a unique form of slavery using a racist
motif. The American form of slavery was unique in that the State
authorized the transfer of the entire bundle of property ownership
rights of the corporeal, spiritual, and intellectual self of one human
being into the hands of another for a price. Over time, the Statejus-
tified this authorization using a variety of reasons. In the history of
the United States, racism has been juxtaposed to highly complex
Rich also states that individuals
raised white in a racist society, are often ridden with white solpsism-not the con-
sciously held beliefthat one race is inherently superior to all others, but a tunnel-vision
which simply does not see nonwhite experience or existence as precious or significant,
unless in spasmodic, impotent guilt-reflexes, which have little or no long-term, con-
tinuing momentum or political usefulness.
Id. at 306. The parallels and intersections between racism, classism, gender bias, and homo-
phobia are apparent here. The white, upper-midde-class, gay male is often mistaken for the
"universal" gay person both within lesbigay communities and in the larger dominating cultures
of the United States of America. Thus, lesbians, gay men, and bi-sexual men and women who
are working class, poor, and/or people of color are often silenced and made invisible to the de-
gree that they diverge from the somewhat mythological one-dimensional "universal" gay per-
son. See id.
6. PATRICIA BEATrTIEJtNG & RALPH F. SMITH, HETEROSEXISM: AN ETHICAL CHALLENGE 13
(1993). In this text, the authors define heterosexism as follows:
Heterosexism is a reasoned system of bias regarding sexual orientation. It denotes
prejudice in favor of heterosexual people and connotes prejudice against bisexual and,
especially, homosexual people. By describing it as a reasoned system of prejudice we do
not mean to imply that it is rationally defensible... . Rather we mean to suggest that
heterosexism is not grounded primarily in emotional fears, hatreds, or other visceral
responses to homosexuality. Instead it is rooted in a largely cognitive constellation of
beliefs about human sexuality.
Id. at 13.
7. Id. at 14.
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countervailing social responses.8 In this paper, by exploring the si-
lenced uncharted areas of the legal, political, and social analysis of
race, I will look at the parallels and intersections between racism and
other forms of oppression, particularly sexualized oppression. Ex-
ploring racism and its environs should facilitate efforts to eradicate
the hegemony that is heterosexism, and especially to rout its virulent
tool: homophobia.9
Although heterosexism is often accompanied by homophobia, no
logical or necessary connection exists between the two. People
who are homophobic may not be heterosexist; those who are het-
erosexist may not be homophobic. Heterosexism is analogous to
racism and sexism. Homophobia finds appropriate analogies in
racial bigotry and misogynism. Whether gay or straight, people
might be homophobic because they cannot think of male same-sex
activity without also imaging men as physically vulnerable, as po-
tentially subject to rape. They cannot think of female same-sex ac-
tivity without imaging women as powerful, as potentially free of
male control. Such images of male vulnerability and female
strength challenge the heterosexist myth to which we have all
grown accustomed. °
I devote three sections of this paper to discussing aspects of Dred
Scott v. Sandford." That infamous 1857 Supreme Court case addressed
constitutional issues related to slavery and the official status of Afri-
can-originated people in the United States. Recently, commentators
stressed the need to take a fresh look at this pivotal case with a
"focus[ ] on the eye of the hurricane: the quiet, silent family mem-
bers whose lives were at stake in that litigation."" Specifically, these
authors reconstruct 3 the circumstances of Dred Scott's Supreme
Court challenge by looking at the other plaintiff in the case: Mrs.
Harriet Robinson Scott.'
4
Conventional accounts of the particulars of Dred Scott's challenge
do not discuss the issues from the perspective of the plaintiff, Harriet
8. See generally, A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATER OF COLOR RACE & THE
AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD (1978).
9. See SUZANNE PHARR, HOMO-PHOBIA: A WEAPON OF SEXISM 53-64 (1988).
10. SeJUNG & SMITH, supra note 6, at 14.
11. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
12. Lea Vandervelde & Sandhya Subramanian, Mrs. Dred Scott, 106 YALE LJ. 1033 (1997).
13. Id. at 1091. The authors indicate that "[b]y the time the case reached the Supreme
Court, Harriet's case had been completely submerged in her husband's.... [The Court] never
considered Harriet Robinson Scott as a candidate for freedom in her own right." Id.
14. Id. at 1059. Having distinct legal claims that were arguably stronger than her hus-
band's, Harriet Robinson Scott brought her own suit for freedom in 1846.
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Robinson Scott, who filed her own freedom suit in 1846.15 Harriet
Scott's voice has been silenced in historical accounts of this Supreme
Court case, making it likely grist for the deconstructive mill. How-
ever, at first blush, it is less clear how relevant Harriet Scott's story is
to issues raised for analysis in this text such as the meaning and just-
ness of sodomy laws or the constitutional rights of lesbigays. This
paper will demonstrate that connection. The necessarily tenuous na-
ture of intimate familial relationships within the slavery context may
be compared to the tenuous nature of intimate familial relationships
among lesbigays under heterosexism.
Very few United States citizens know anything about the life of
Dred Scott beyond the effects of racism on his legal status as slave.
Moreover, Dred Scott's name itself has become synonymous for the
United States Supreme Court's racist denial of citizenship perpe-
trated against Dred Scott, his family, and all African-originated peo-
ples living in the United States. I will provide a statement of the facts
of the Dred Scott v. Sandford case. Then I will compare Dred Scott to
Bowers v. Hardwick, the Supreme Court's 1986 ruling on same-sex
consensual sodomy.
This paper is about the process of deconstruction. I attempt to
model a deconstructive process in the writing of this text, and I hope
readers commence their own deconstructive process as they read the
text. In a deconstructive context, the reader is not merely a passive
recipient of the writer's intended meaning; the reader is required to
actively ferret out the silent messages of the text and to consciously
remix17 the text to include those messages. To be sure, this multi-
layered approach to reading and writing text is work and it can be
confusing, but I am convinced that it is well worth the effort. As you
will see throughout the text, I link the deconstructive process to the
possibility ofjustice. In fact, Jacques Derrida, a primary developer of
18deconstructionist criticism, has said that deconstruction isjustice.
Based on the idea that "[e]very text, through interpretation, can
be shown to contain a multiplicity of meanings, [so, the deconstruc-
tive critical process attempts to carefully dismantle] the intended
meaning of the text and expose [inherent, inconsistent] meanings
15. Id. at 1040.
16. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
17. According to my son, Kahlil Seren, a musician, the term remix denotes generally, in
hip-hop, rap, or popular music, the same lyrics may be recorded with a different accompanying
beat or instrumental background. According to my son, Daudi Hashim, the meaning of the
music, its flavor, is subtlely or radically changed by the remix. Remix is a shift in musical per-
spective.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 212-234.
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within the work."19 Deconstructionists have developed techniques
for "outing"" these inconsistent meanings. Some of these tech-
niques are used within this text and may also be used upon this text
in the reader's attempt to deconstruct it. Let the reader be cau-
tioned, there are no concrete rules of deconstruction akin to rules of
syntax or grammar. Deconstruction techniques unfold pragmatically.
However, as an introduction to this complex process, here are some
commonly used techniques in deconstruction:
1. comparing that work to other works by the same [writer];
2. analyzing internal contradictions in the work;
3. using the [writer's] life history and social, political, and class
background to contradict claims of the work;
4. using statements made by the [writer] in interviews, reviews, and
so on to expose inconsistencies between the [writer's] claims and
statements in the work;
5. analyzing the actual language used and its relationship to the at-
titudes, emotions, ideas, and so forth that the [writer] is communi-
cating in the work.
21
As indicated by this list of deconstruction techniques, the decon-
structive reader uses the author's life to deconstruct the text. The
19. HERBERT KOHL, FROM ARCHETYPE TO ZEITGEIST: POWERFUL IDEAS FOR POWERFUL
THINKING 29 (1992).
20. In this case, the metaphor, "outing" is extended to include the act of exposing or re-
vealing any true, but hidden nature of a person, place or thing. This expression is derived from
lesbigay culture. Compare and contrast it to the lesbigay expression, being in the closet. To be
"out" means that the lesbigay person has intentionally revealed the fact that he or she is lesbi-
gay. "Outing" refers to an action by an externalized force or by internal motivation that reveals
to one or more people the lesbigay sexual orientation of a person who is not known to be a les-
bigay individual. A person who intentionally avoids disclosing his or her lesbigay sexual orienta-
tion is said to be "closeted" or in the closet. Being in the closet is a strategy for protection
against heterosexism similar to the strategy of passing for white that is used by African-
Americans from the time of slavery until today. It is also similar to the syncretization of religious
acts to mask one s faith when religion is under attack e.g., the conversos Jews of Spain who
masked theirJewish worship with Catholicism during the Inquisition; the Yoruba people of West
Africa masked their religious practice with Catholicism in Central and South America and Prot-
estantism in North America during slavery so that they could continue to worship Ifa or Orisa
without being punished harshly, and the Wiccan pagans who masked their religious practices in
various forms of Christian practice to avoid being burned or otherwise tortured as witches. A
lesbigay person can "come out of the closet" by "outing" him/herself, or sometimes closeted
people are outed by others either intentionally or inadvertently. Although these terms suggest
polarities, they more often reflect a range of self-disclosing activity as when a generally closeted
lesbigay person may disclose to an associate or small group of friends. Having revealed to a
small group of people that she is a lesbian, it is easy to see how an otherwise closeted lesbian
could be outed by one of her confidants inadvertently. Another example of the complexity of
the closeted/out continuum is when a lesbigay person who is said to be generally out: that is, his
or her family, friends, or neighbors are privy to his or her sexual orientation, but in the work-
place the person is in the closet. Additionally, there are lesbigay political activist groups that
view the use of intentional outing as a viable political strategy to encourage closeted public offi-
cials and other closeted public figures to assist lesbigay struggle for equal rights under the law.
21. &e KOHL, supra, note 19, at 29.
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author's entire selfhood may function as a tool to dismantle in-
tended or voiced meaning toward the goal of uncovering alternative,
unvoiced meaning.
This paper is also a personal, artistic rendering. In this writing, I
use poetry to explicate, to illuminate, to obscure, to deconstruct. I
do not pretend to have an obligatory distance from the subject area.
My life is personally affected by the very existence of wanted or un-
wanted sodomic acts, on the one hand, and the press of unjust sod-
omy laws, on the other hand.23 The fact that I am an out lesbian,
not gay nor bi-sexual or heterosexual, makes a difference in my writ-
ing of this text. Likewise, the fact that I am an African-American
woman from a small town also informs this writing. That my family
of origin is hard-working class, also affects my word choice and may
even shade the meanings of the words I choose to write. I am also a
birth-parent, co-parenting two sons, with my long-term partner in a
monogamous lesbian relationship. My partner, Anmina Mary Osten-
doff, is a second-generation adopted person; we presume that she is
European-American. One of our sons is bi-racial; the other one is
black; both are African-American identified.2S As a non-traditional
22. By its nature, language reveals particular meaning and intent while necessarily masking
or hiding from view alternative meanings and intentionality. Therefore, one could argue that
included in a particular word is the expression of all of its alternatives. Because of the inherent
compactness of poetic processes such as the metaphor or the simile, this revealing/obscuring
effect is intensified. Both metaphor and simile are implied rather than explicit comparison;
also they are expansive ways of thinking. Moreover, they form complex wholes, more than the
sum of their parts; and like a hologram, like chiaroscuro, or like an Escher painting, they de-
pend upon the perspective of the perceiver for their very existence. The juxtapositioning of
terms expands meaning and suggests broader and deeper meaning than the language on its
face would reveal.
23. See LESBIANs, GAYMEN, AND THE LAW 80 n.1 (William B. Rubenstein ed. 1993). As of
1996, the following twenty-three states still had sodomy laws: Alabama (ALA. CODE § 13A-6-63
(1994)); Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1411 (West 1989)); Arkansas (ARE. CODE ANN. §
5-14-122 (1993)); Florida (FLA. STAT. § 800.02 (1991)); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2
(1996)); Idaho (IDAHO CODE § 18-6605 (1987)); Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505 (1988));
Louisiana (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:89 (West 1986)); Maryland (MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, §§
55-554 (1996)); Michigan (MiCH. COMIP. LAWS §§ 750.158, 750.338-.338(b) (1991)); Minnesota
(MINN. STAT. § 609.293 (1987)); Mississippi (MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-59 (1994)); Missouri
(MO. REV. STAT. § 56.090 (1979)); Montana (MONT. CODE ANN., §§45-2-101, 45-5-505 (1987));
Nevada (NEt. REV. STAT. § 201.190 (1987)); North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (1993));
Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 § 886 (1992)); Rhode Island (RI. GEN. LAWs § 11-10-1 (1994));
South Carolina (S.C. CODEANN. § 16-15-120 (Law Co-op. 1985)); Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 39-2-612 (1991)); Texas (TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (1994)); Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. §
76-5-403 (1988)); Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-361 (1996)).
24. In this case, the word "out" is used as shorthand for the fact that I readily acknowledge
that I am a lesbian.
25. Our bi-racial son reasons that, based on breeding practices perpetrated against en-
slaved African-originated people and because of the pervasive sexual misuse of African-
originated people regardless of the degree of servitude, nearly all African-Americans today
could loosely describe ourselves "bi-racial" or "mixed."
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law student,26 I bring to bear on the subject of this paper particular
insights, and both traditional and unique investigative tools. Like all
legal critical analysts, my investigative style is informed, and perhaps
limited, by my perspective and life experience. Unlike many ana-
lysts, I admit it. These admissions and disclosures are intended to
assist the reader in engaging in the reader's own deconstructive
process with this text and with me.
Still, this is a paper about sodomy. A large portion of this paper
discusses state sodomy laws. My analysis includes references to Ju-
deo-Christian mythology, Colonial, and Early American definitions
and treatment of sodomic acts. This paper discusses consensual
adult sexual relationships; however, the paper does not avoid discus-
sion of non-consenting sexualized sodomic acts whether overtly vio-
lent, coercive, or more subtly manipulative.
Heterosexism finds a powerful tool in these laws which hamstring,
thwart and endanger lesbigay day to day existence. These are peril-
27
ous and pivotal times for lesbigay people. The effect of the infa-
mous Bowers v. Hardwick28 Supreme Court decision of 1986, at its
core, is frighteningly reminiscent of the effect of the Dred Scot 9 deci-
sion of over a century earlier. As Supreme Court Justice Brennan
once said, 'We remain imprisoned by the past as long as we deny its
influence in the present. "
Deconstructing Sodomy suggests that privacy rights are insufficient
tools for dismantling heterosexism and in fact, may actually serve to
perpetuate heterosexist oppression. Most importantly, in the follow-
ing pages, I am calling for a new reading of the nature of lesbigay in-
timate relationships for the sake ofjustice.
26. Dominating culture defines me as "non-traditional" because I am outside the status
quo. I am not a twenty-something, European-American, heterosexual, male - this perspective
marginalizes me. From my perspective, putting myself at center, I believe that as a result of ex-
traordinary efforts, my school has released enough race, class, gender and heterosexual biases
for me to accept membership as a student.
27. See, e.g., HUFF, Black Ministers Declare War Against Lesbians and Gay Men: Your Silence Will
Not Protect Yoz4 in BIACKLESBIANS DO NOT EXIS, supra note 1, at92.
28. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
29. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). Justice Taney asked, "[clan a negro [sic]
... become a member of the political community formed and brought into existence by the
Constitution of the United States, and as such become entitled to all the rights, and priieges,
and immunities, guarantiedby that instrument to the citizen[?]" Id. at 403 (emphasis added). He
answered with a resounding Nol Id. The ramifications of his opinion included the granting of
tacit permission to further abuse, disrespect, and disenfranchise Negroes in the United States.
Hence, "free Negro" or "free Black" citizen was oxymoronic and non-existent according to fed-
eral law. SeeDean, infranote 90.
30. McCleskeyv. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 344 (1987) (Brennan,J., dissenting) (5.4 decision).
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BOWERS v HARDWiCK: THE TUNNEL
The little-known facts of Bowers v. Hardwick" are significant. After
working all night putting in insulation to renovate a gay bar where
he was a bartender, a co-worker handed Michael Hardwick a beer as
he stood by the door of the bar.32 Hardwick took one sip of the beer,
then pitched the beer can in a waste basket positioned at the door of
the bar and proceeded on his short walk home.
Officer Torick, a police officer known for his frequent ticketing of
gay people in the area, drove by, turned around, and stopped Hard-
wick a block from the bar. The officer forced Hardwick to sit in the
back seat of the police car while he argued with Hardwick about what
he said he saw. Finally, after refusing to look for Hardwick's beer
can in the trash, the police officer gave Hardwick a ticket for travel-
ing with an open can of beer.
6
At the top of Hardwick's ticket, the officer wrote Wednesday, as
the court hearing day, in bold, underlined lettering. However, the
court date that he wrote in smaller print in the column was for
18Tuesday, instead . Hardwick did not notice the discrepancy between
the day and the date of his required court appearance until it was
too late.3 9
Tuesday afternoon, a mere two hours after Hardwick unintention-
ally missed the actual court date, the police officer came to Hard-
wick's home with a warrant for his arrest because Hardwick had nei-
ther paid his fine nor appeared in court that moming. ° Hardwick
31. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
32. Peter Irons, Intemdew with Michael Hardwick, in LESBIANS, GAY MEN AND THE LAW 126
(William Rubenstien ed. 1993).
33. See Irons, supranote 32, at 126.
34. See Irons, supra note 32, at 126.
35. See Irons, supra note 32, at 126. He questioned Hardwick about his activities for over
twenty minutes. Id. Hardwick insisted that he had merely tossed the beer can in the trash and
offered to prove it to the police officer. Id. He explained that he was exhausted and simply
wanted to go home to rest, but even when the officer drove back to the bar, he refused to get
out of the squad car. Id.
36. See Irons, supra note 32, at 126.
37. See Irons, supra note 32, at 126. Later, Hardwick speculated that the officer's objection
to a beer can that had already been deposited in the trash was merely a pretext; the officer was
actually interested in harassing a gay man under the color of law. Id. Torick had a reputation
for monitoring the gays to whom he gave tickets, picking up warrants issued against them in
such cases, and actually serving the warrants himself. Id. Hardwick decided to simply pay the
fine so that he would have no more trouble from the officer. Id.
38. SeeIrons, supra note 32, at 126.
39. See Irons, supra note 32, at 126. Ordinarily, it takes the derk of courts at least forty-
eight hours to process such a warrant, but Officer Torrick had processed the warrant himself.
Id.
40. See Irons, supranote 32, at 126.
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was not at home.4' Upon discovering the day and date error on the
ticket, Hardwick promptly went to the court, exposed the police er-
42
ror on the ticket, and paid the fine.
At work, a few weeks after the hearing, Hardwick took the car keys
from an inebriated customer and sent him to Michael's nearby home
in a cab to sleep off the effects of alcohol before driving. 3 Hardwick
let him sleep it off on his living room sofa until morning.4 On the
same evening, Michael Hardwick's male lover came to town to see
Hardwick.4
46It was a hot August morning in Atlanta, Georgia. Hardwick left
his front door ajar. 4 7 At about 8:30 the next morning, in spite of the
court clerk's assurance over three weeks earlier, Officer Torick en-
tered Hardwick's home through an unlocked door and partially46
roused the person sleeping on the sofa. This groggy guest pointed
to the back bedroom when Torick asked for Michael Hardwick.49 Us-
ing a warrant that had not been valid for nearly four weeks, Officer
Torick walked through the house and entered Hardwick's bedroom
while Hardwick and his partner were having mutual oral sex.5O
Hardwick heard a noise, looked up, and saw Officer Torick standing
in his bedroom watching as they made love.5 After being observed,
the officer identified himself, stated that he had a warrant for Hard-
wick's arrest, and arrested Hardwick and his lover for sodomy. 2
After placing Hardwick and his lover under arrest, Officer Torick
refused to leave the bedroom while they dressed, stating, "there's no
reason for that because [he] had already seen them in their most in-
timate aspect."3 When he brought Hardwick and his friend into the
41. See Irons, supra note 32, at 126. Officer Torrick identified himself to Hardwick's room-
mate, and after he left, the roommate immediately informed Hardwick about the officer's visit.
Id.
42. SeeIrons, supra note 32, at 126.
43. SeeIrons, supra note 32, at 126.
44. SeeIrons, supra note 32, at 126.
45. SeeIrons, supra note 32, at 126.
46. See Irons, supra note 32, at 126. The customer was so drunk that he did not even notice
when Hardwick came home nor that his lover had come with him. Id.
47. See Irons, supranote32, at 126.
48. SeeIrons, supra note 32, at 126.
49. See Irons, supra note 32, at 127. Hardwick said he heard a noise as the door moved
from a cracked to an open position, but when he looked up there was no one visible, so he
thought a breeze blew the door. Id.
50. See Irons, supra note 32, at 127.
51. See Irons, supra note 32, at 127.
52. See Irons, supra note 32, at 127. Officer Torick said that the fact that the warrant was
invalid did not matter, because he was acting under good faith. Id.
53. SeeIrons, supranote 32, at 128. In the squad car, Torick handcuffed them to the floor,
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police substation, Officer Torick announced to the guards, everyone
processing documents, and all of the detainees in the holding cell
that they had been arrested for "cocksucking and [they] should be
able to get what [they] [were] looking for in the holding cell."5 4
Hardwick's lover chose to remain anonymous after police released
him.55 Because he was in Atlanta to land a government job, Hard-
wick's partner pled no-contest, paid the imposed fine, and quickly
left town to avoid further trauma including the notoriety of any pub-
lic accounting."r As for Hardwick, an American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) attorney contacted him to ask if he would consider taking
his case to trial to challenge the sodomy statute.57 Hardwick's cir-
cumstance made him an ideal candidate to be used as a test case to
challenge the constitutionality of the Georgia sodomy law for several
reasons. First, Hardwick was making love in the privacy of his own
bedroom when the police officer entered. Many other gay men had
been discovered by police officers sexually engaged in secluded yet
relatively public areas such as parks or automobiles where there is a
lower expectation of privacy." Secondly, Hardwick did not hide the
fact that he was gay, so he had no sexual orientation secret to pro-
tect.5 9 Thirdly, he was a bartender at a gay bar, so he did not fear los-
ing his job because of his sexual orientation. 60 Lastly and perhaps
most importantly, Hardwick had the loyal support of family and
61 62friends. Hardwick agreed to be a test case.
took them to a police substation, and left them sitting in the back of the squad car for over
twenty-five minutes. Id.
54. See Irons, supra note 32, at 128. Within an hour of being placed in the holding cell,
someone came to post bail for Hardwick, however the police officers took an additional twelve
hours to process his release. Id. After four hours, the police removed Hardwick and improperly
placed Hardwick in an area of the jail that held convicted criminals. Id. Again Torick an-
nounced to these criminals that Hardwick was in jail for cocksucking. Id.
55. See Irons, supra note 32, at 128.
56. See Irons, supra note 32, at 128.
57. See Irons, supra note 32, at 128.
58. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977). The Court determined that there
is a "lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehide because its function is transportation and it
seldom serves as one s residence or as the repository of personal effects... . It travels public
thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain view." Id. (quoting Cardwell
v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality opinion)).
59. See Irons, supra note 32, at 128.
60. SeeIrons, supra note 32, at 128.
61. SeeIrons, supra note 32, at 128.
62. See Irons, supra note 32, at 128. Affiliated with Georgia's ACLU, Clint Sumrall searched
Georgia courts daily for five years looking for a sodomy test case. Id. When constitutional rights
are at issue, advocacy organizations such as the ACLU or National Association for the Advance-
ment of Colored People (NAACP) often seek the optimal aggrieved party who can best present
a prevailing case.
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When it became apparent that Hardwick and the ACLU, intended
to challenge the law, prosecutors refused to set a court date, andV.3
dropped the charges. By dropping the state felony sodomy
charges,6 prosecutors attempted to thwart Hardwick's challenge and
avoid ensuing public critique of the statute.6'
Hardwick filed a complaint, however, in District Court, against At-
lanta's olice commissioner and Georgia Attorney General, Michael
Bowers, challenging the constitutionality of Georgia's sodomy stat-
ute.67 An anonymous heterosexual married couple, John and Mary
Doe, joined in the complaint and claimed that Hardwick's arrest
harmed their marriage by creating a chilling effect on their own sex-
ual expression. 9
On its face, Georgia's sodomy statute is sexual-orientation neutral
and draws no distinctions between married or unmarried sexual en-
counters. The Georgia anti-sodomy statute provides as follows:
(a) A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or
submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person
and the mouth or anus of another. A person commits the offense
of aggravated sodomy when he commits sodomy with force and
against the will of the other person.
(b) A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be punished
by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20years. A person
convicted of the offense of aggravated sodomy shall be punished
by imprisonment for life or by imprisonment for not less than one nor
more than 20 years.70
At best, the Georgia sodomy statute offers only a muddied distinc-
tion between consenting sodomic acts between adults and non-
consenting acts perpetrated against another. In the first section, the
statute distinguishes "sodomy and aggravated sodomy."7' Using plain
meaning interpretation, "sodomy," in Georgia, is necessarily a con-
sensual encounter, that is, non-coerced, with a person who is capable
63. SeeIrons, supra note 32, at 128.
64. See Irons, supra note 32, at 128. After the preliminary hearing, the District Attorney
decided not to present the matter to the grand jury unless further evidence developed. Id.
(emphasis added).
65. See Irons, supra note 32, at 128.
66. SeeBowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
67. Id. at 190.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. GA. CODE ANN., § 16-6-2 (1992) (emphasis added). See Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d
1202, 1204 (11 Cir. 1985); but seeBowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 188 (citing only what the Court
deemed to be the "pertinent pare of the statute).
71. GA. CODE ANN., § 16-6-2 (1992).
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of consent. Conversely, "aggravated sodomy" is by definition non-
consensual; in many jurisdictions, aggravated sodomy so defined is
rape.7 ' These two activities are qualitatively different. However, the
second section of the Georgia sodomy statute fails to adequately dis-
tinguish the penalties associated with these qualitatively disparate
acts. For example, under Georgia's sodomy statute, it is possible for
a person who has been convicted of non-consensual sodomy, like anal
rape, to receive a shorter prison term than a person who engaged in
acts of consensual sodomy as innocuous as oral sex with another
adult.7 A person convicted of sodomy involving non-consensual anal
penetration of a disfavored other, for example, a transvestite, a gay
man, a lesbian, a transsexual person, or a prostitute, could receive a
one year sentence if found guilty, while two consenting same-sex adult
partners who are convicted of sodomy could be sentenced to the
• 74
twenty-year maximum.
Although Georgia's sodomy statute is sexual-orientation neutral
on its face, the Supreme Court did not rule on the entire statute.75
Avoiding confrontation with the inequities inherent in the statute,
the Supreme Court decision excerpted the statute, citing only what it
termed the "pertinent part."76 Nevertheless, the Court let stand the
entire statute.7
Significantly, the District Court ruled thatJohn and Mary Doe had
no standing to present a claim, since they were "in no immediate dan-
ger of sustaining injury based on the statute."78  The trial court rea-
soned that no heterosexual married couple need worry about having
a police officer enter their bedroom and arrest them for engaging in
a consensual sexual activity.79 The trial court dismissed Hardwick's
claim for "failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
72. Id.
73. Id. I am not suggesting here that consensual anal sex is any less innocuous than consen-
sual oral sex.
74. Under the Georgia statute, aggravated sodomy, or rape involving the sexual organs of
one person and the mouth or anus of another person, bears the penalty of one to twenty years
or life while consensual sodomy bears a one to twenty years penalty. Conceivably, a sympathetic
rapist of a disfavored victim could get a mere one or two years sentence, while two consenting
adults could receive the maximum sentence allowed, i.e., twenty years in prison.
75. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 186.
76. In Bowers v. Hardwick, the Court noted the pertinent parts of the statute as follows: "(a)
A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to any sexual act involv-
ing the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another .... (b) A person convicted
of the offense of sodomy shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more
than 20 years... ." 478 U.S. at 186.
77. Id. at 190.
78. Hardwickv. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1204 (11th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added).
79. Id.
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granted."" Hardwick and the Does appealed to the Eleventh Circuit
Court. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the trial court's decision re-
garding Hardwick's claim,8' but affirmed the District Court s dis-
missal ofJohn and Mary Doe's claim.82 The standing of each of the
"plaintiffs ... depend[ed] on whether the threat of prosecution under
this statute is real and immediate or imaginary and speculative."83 The
court reasoned that the heterosexual couple were in no apparent
danger of being arrested based on this facially neutral statute.8
When the defendants appealed to the United States Supreme Court,
the Court reversed the appellate decision in its five-to-four split deci-
sion against Hardwick."'
Implying that the Bowers decision is imprudent and unjust, Justice
Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, ad-
monished the five justice majority because "in its haste to reverse...
the Court relegates the statute being challenged to a footnote and
ignores the procedural posture of the case." 6 Moreover, Justice
Blackmun accused the Court of distorting the question presented. 7
The Supreme Court ruled "against Mr. Hardwick and against jus-
tice."m Unfortunately, Bowers is not the first case to acquire a reputa-
tion of having an unjust outcome with far-reaching implications.
DRE SCOTT V. SANDopD. THE DARK-TIME
The story usually told about Dred Scott is over-simplified and in-
complete.8' Recently, researchers have called for a new reading of
Dred Scott, having plumbed the depths of its documented history and
revealed buried facts of the case. The significance of these newly
emerging facts resonates for those of us who seek to understand the
parallels and intersections of oppression that defy our attempts to
80. Id. (quoting FED. R. C. P. 12(b)(6)).
81. Id. at 1212-13.
82. Id. at 1204-06 (describing the jurisdictional issue of standing).
83. See Bowers, 760 F.2d at 1205 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
84. Id.
85. SeeBowers, 478 U.S. at 200 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). See Irons, supra note 32, at 180.
86. &eBowers, 478 U.S. at 200 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See generally, Vandervelde & Subramanian, supra note 12 (telling the little-known story
of Dred Scott's wife, Harriet Robinson, who filed "her own case for freedom, a case that was
submerged in his." Id. at 1034.).
90. SeeVandervelde & Subramanian, supra note 12; Eric T. Dean, Jr., ReassesingDred Scott:
The Possibil'ties of Federal Power in the Antebellum Contr4, 60 U. CQN. L. REV. 713 (1992); Simeon
C.R. McIntosh, Reading Dred Scott, Plessy and Brown: Toward a Constitutional Henneneutcs, 38
How. LJ. 53 (1994).
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eliminate racism, heterosexism, classism, sexism, and other forms of
systemic abuse. Originally, the infamous Dred Scott case was not one
case but two, because Harriet Robinson Scott filed her own claim for
freedom in 1846.91 Consider Harriet Scott's claim.
She was hiding when I found her
in the dark
crouched down deep, still
but the light shone
from her eyes closed against
the blackness
a rhythmical pulse beat
drumming
for justice
just once
In time
to be heard seen in the silent shade
as my syncopated intuition
guided my heart like sonar
to a place certain
to synchronize
with unintended
reverberations
of her elegant essence
Oh yes,
She was hiding
the darkness
when
I found her
when I found her.?
HARRIET ROBINSON SCOTT: THE SHADOW'S SHADOW
Harriet Robinson was about seventeen years old when her owner,
Major Lawrence Taliaferro, performed a formal public ceremony of
marriage. 9 He united Dred Scott, a post surgeon's forty-year-old
slave, and Harriet Robinson, whom he said he "gave" to Dred.? Also,
91. See Vandervelde & Subramanian, supra note 12, at 1040 (exploring several legal claims
she could have raised at that time).
92. HuFF, Linda, in BLACKLESBiANS DO NOT EXIST, supra note 1, at 5.
93. SeeVandervelde & Subramanian, supranote 12, at 1050 (noting that the ceremony took
place "sometime between May 8, 1836, and September 14, 1837").
94. See Vandervelde & Subramanian, supra note 12, at 1054 (referring to LAWRENCE
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Taliaferro referred to Harriet as his "servant girl," not his "slave,"
which is significant because "if a slave married a free woman, with
the consent of his master, he was emancipated."95 At Fort Snelling,
Taliaferro conducted legal marriage ceremonies between and among
the Sioux, the Ojibwa, African-originated people, and other fort per-
sonnel 6 In a newspaper interview, Taliaferro recalled "marrying the
two and giving the girl her freedom."97 In fact, Taliaferro released all
of the enslaved people that he had owned.98  It is ironic that
Taliaferro referred to Harriet's marriage and freedom in the same
sentence, because married women in those days were actually chat-
tel, the property of their husbands. Indeed,
by marriage, the husband and wife [were] one person in law: that
is, the very being or legal existence of the woman [was] suspended
during the marriage, or at least [was] incorporated and consoli-
dated into that of the husband; under whose wing, protection, and
cover she performs everything; and is therefore called in our law-
french a feme-covert, foemina viro co-erta; it is said to be covert-baron,
or under the protection and influence of her husband, her baron,
or lord; and her condition during her marriage is called her cover-
ture
. 9
By legally marrying Harriet Robinson to Dred Scott, Taliaferro ac-
tually jeopardized the freedom he had conferred upon her. To a
great extent, mid-nineteenth century United States was still bound to
the doctrine of marital unity which "affirmed the inferior status of
wife; but it was under attack.""° This doctrine was based on a read-
ing of Biblical dogma and included common law, metaphysical, and
religious canons. By the 1830s, isolated state statutes conferred
upon married women a variety of new rights, privileges, and respon-
sibilities mainly related to their ability to own property, the ability to
contract with another, and the ability to file suit separately from her
husband.'02 Although Harriet's legal counsel filed her distinct claim,
new counsel filing in federal court ignored Harriet Robinson Scott's
complaint, dissolving it into her husband's suit for acknowledgment
TAUIAFERRO, AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MAJOR LAWRENCE TALIAFERRO (1864)).
95. SeeVandervelde & Subramanian, sup ra note 12, at 1099, 1105.
96. See Vandervelde & Subramanian, supra note 12, at 1054.
97. SeeVandervelde & Subramanian, supra note 12, at 1099 (citation omitted).
98. See Vandervelde & Subramanian, supra note 12, at 1099.
99. WILLIAM BLACESTONE, BiAcKsToNE's COMMENTARIES, in KATHARINE T. BARTLETr,
GENDERAND THE LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY 2-3 (1993).
100. Id.at4-5.
101. Id. at 5.
102. Id.at5.
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of his freedom.1'0
African-originated people who were enslaved were considered to
be "chattel" and therefore, could not be legally married nor make
any other legally binding contracts.14 In slavery, there could be only
one head: the slave master; in marriage, there could be only one
head of household: the husband. These patriarchal institutions -
slavery and marriage - present a conflict of interest and are mutually
exclusive. The familial relationships established among these en-
slaved people were precarious and dependent upon the permissive-
ness of the slave owner. With some provisos, however, African-
originated people who were not enslaved were permitted to be mar-
ried.105
The Scotts had four children: two boys who both died as infants
and two girls who were alive during the twelve-year legal battle for
their right to live as a free family.'0 6 The Scotts knew that fertile fe-
male children and young adult females brought in a high price in107
the slave market as breeders. Just as the owner of a bitch owns the
pups born to a dog, and just as the owner of a heifer owns the calves
born of the cow; so the owner of an enslaved female owns the chil-
dren born by virtue of a sexual liaison between two enslaved peo-
ple.0 A child possessed the same status of freedom as did his or her
mother.'09 Children who were born of a free mother were also con-
sidered free.n ° By claiming her freedom, Harriet Scott sought to se-
cure her daughters' freedom as well."'
Slave owners were probably interested less in emancipating fe-
males like Harriet and her daughters than they were interested in
marketing them as breeders."' Dred Scott, on the other hand, died
less than a year after the Supreme Court rendered its decision on the
103. See generally, Vandervelde & Subramanian, supra note 12.
104. See Dred Scottv. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
105. Se e.g., Vandervelde & Subramanian, supra note 12, at 1034 (stating the Harriet Robin-
son Scott lived "at the intersection of multiple oppressions" invoking race, class, gender, and
enslavement).
106. SeeVandervelde & Subramanian, supra note 12, at 1050.
107. SeeVandervelde & Subramanian, supra note 12, at 1050.
108. See Carruth v. Easterling, 150 So. 2d 852 (Miss. 1963).
109. See generaily, Vandervelde & Subramanian, supra note 12, at 1076.
110. See generaly, Vandervelde & Subramanian, supra note 12, at 1076.
111. See Vandervelde & Subramanian, supra note 12, at 1116 (stating that because Harriet
could argue that she was free at the time of her marriage, any "children she had with Dred
would follow her status, and would thereby be free as well").
112. SeeVandervelde & Subramanian, supra note 12, at 1076 (noting that "[a]dolescent girls,
sold in slave markets, were priced for their child-bearing potential").
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case."1 Exerting ownership over the Scott family was simply a matter
of white lawmakers' economics: to breed females or sell them as
breeders.
Harriet Scott's claim to freedom made for an even stronger plain-
tiffs' case than Dred Scott's case. Harriet Scott's claim could have
been based on the fact that she had long resided in a free territory or
on the fact that Taliaferro had manumitted her at the same time that
he performed the formal, legal marriage between her and Dred."4
Moreover, Harriet Scott's two daughters, born of a free woman,
would have also been free.115
Further, her claim to freedom could have encompassed Dred Scott
as well. Some research suggests that "[b]efore 1857, when the Su-
preme Court decided Dred Scott, marriage and slavery were viewed
as sufficiently incompatible in most Norther states [,and] a slave's
marriage to a free woman was deemed to emancipate the slave.""' In
Southern states, enslaved people were simply not permitted to have
legally binding marriages, although enslaved parties could ask for
permission to cohabitate at the pleasure of their owners."7  Occa-
sionally, this permission granted was marked by a celebration which
could include "jumping the broom" and other festivities that give so-
cial sanction to the coupling, but no legal status."8 The law in
Southern states afforded the slave marriage no respect or priority in
the face of the slave owner's decision to transfer ownership of one or
all of the enslaved, shattering the family of the enslaved." 9
Although Fort Snelling was in free territory where slavery had been
prohibited since 1787, the federal government directly participated
in the spread of slavery into the Northwest Territory .... The
113. SeeVandervelde & Subramanian, supra note 12, at 1034 (reporting that during the trial,
at fifty-one years of age, Dred had already lived eleven years beyond the life expectancy of an
enslaved man and was sick with tuberculosis. He died in 1858.).
114. SeeVandervelde & Subramanian, supra note 12, at 1050.
115. SeeVandervelde & Subramanian, supra note 12, at 1116.
116. SeeVandervelde & Subramanian, supra note 12, at 1041 (emphasis added).
117. See Vandervelde & Subramanian, supra note 12, at 1041 (explaining how Southern
states denied "the institution of marriage as a civil contract to slaves who married other slaves or
even free persons").
118. One common ceremony used to note that two enslaved people had decided to and
been granted permission to keep house together, was to have the committed persons to literallyjump over a broom stick together. Once on the other side of the stick, they were said to be
married. No one knows the origin ofjumping the broom. However, it sounds like a horribly
disrespectful joke that a sadistic master played on an enslaved couple. Ironically, today, in
Afrocentric marriage ceremonies, couples often choose to jump the broom to commemorate
their ancestors' struggle to maintain families in spite of the tribulations of slavery. See
Vandervelde & Subramanian, supra note 12, at 1041.
119. See Vandervelde & Subramanian, supra note 12, at 1041.
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Army would pay any officer an additional allowance, often the
same amount that a private would earn, for the keeping of one ser-
vant since officers were expected to uphold a certain class status
while in service even on the frontier.... [When an officer mar-
ried, he frequently availed himself of a servant allotment to buy or
rent a slave of his own .... [T]he officers apparently solved the
problem of a domestic labor shortage by importing slaves.... The
presence of this entire community of enslaved people at the fed-
eral fort presents an obvious legal contradiction.20
While racism and classism maintained their enslavement, gender-
ism, heterosexism, and classism occluded the view of Harriet Robin-
son Scott's case and silenced her claim for freedom not merely for
herself, but for the freedom of her entire family to remain intact, in
intimate association, by subsuming her case under Dred Scott.
DRED SCOTT. A SHADOW ON AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP
The usual telling of the Dred Scott story reads as follows. A slave
in the State of Missouri, Dred Scott was taken by his master, Surgeon
Emerson, into a "free" territory of the United States, and as a result
of his foray into the land of freedom, Dred Scott, presuming himself
to be free, "brought this action in the Circuit Court of the United
States for that district, to assert the title of himself and his family to
freedom."' Dred Scott filed his claim as an action in diversity,
meaning that he claimed he and the defendant were citizens of two
122different states. He appealed all the way to the Supreme Court,
where in 1857, Chief Justice Taney stated that there were "two lead-
ing questions by the record: [First,] had the Circuit Court of the
United States jurisdiction to hear and determine the case between
these parties?; and [second,] if it had jurisdiction, is the judgment it
has given erroneous or not?"1
In Dred Scott, the Court, in a seven to two decision, explained that
federal jurisdiction defines the federal court's constitutional capacity
to hear a claim and cannot be consented to nor waived by the par-
ties.24 According to the majority, the question of the federal courts'
jurisdiction to hear the arguments in Dred Scott's case rested on the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution framers' original
intent regarding the Negro race.12s The Court made inferences re-
120. See Vandervelde & Subramanian, supra note 12, at 1047-48 (citations omitted).
121. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 400 (emphasis added).
122. Id.
123. I&
124. Id.
125. Id. at400-402.
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garding the intent of the Constitution's framers based solely on lit-
eral elements." To determine the framers' original intent, Justice
Taney compared and contrasted the status of the Negro race with
Native Americans, whom he called "the uncivilized ... yet free and
independent people ... who were situated in territories to which the
white race claimed the ultimate right of dominion."'2
Justice Taney averred that although subject to white sovereignty,
Indian political communities have always been treated as foreign-
ers ... in a state of pupilage[, and may be] naturalized by the
authority of Congress, and become citizens of a State, and of the
United States; and if an individual [Indian] should leave his nation
or tribe, and take up his abode among the white population, he
would be entitled to all the rights and privileges which would be-
long to an emigrant from any other foreign people.'28
Justice Taney then turned his focus to the Negro race, and asked,
Can a negro [sic], whose ancestors were imported into this coun-
try, and sold as slaves, become a member of the political commu-
nity formed and brought into existence by the Constitution of the
United States, and as such become entitled to all the rights, and
privileges, and immunities, guarantied by that instrument to the
citizen? One of which rights is the privilege of suing in a court of
the United States in the cases specified in the constitution.In
Specifically, in the majority's view, the phrase "people of the
United States" and the word "citizens" are "synonymous terms[,] that
denote the political body who collectively hold the power and con-
duct the Government through their representatives." 0 According to
our republican institutions, the people are the sovereignty.
131
According to the majority's perception of the original intent of the
framers of the United States Constitution, a slave or a free Negro
112could not be a citizen of the United States. Justice Taney reasoned
that if the framers had wanted Negroes to be citizens, they would
126. See Dred Scot 60 U.S. at 404405 (stating that Negroes were not intended to be citizens
under the Constitution and that at the time the Constitution was drafted, Negroes were consid-
ered a "subordinate and inferior class of beings who had been subjugated by the dominant race,
and whether emancipated or not ... had no rights or privileges but such as those who hold the
power and Government might choose to grant them.").
127. Id. at 403-404 (emphasis added).
128. Id. at 404 (emphasis added).
129. Id. at 403.
130. Id. at 404.
131. See Dred Scott 60 U.S. at 404.
132. See id. at 404 (stating that Negroes are not citizens, nor were they intended to be re-
garded as citizens who receive the benefits of such status).
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have expressly said so. 33 Justice Taney emphasized the silence of the
framers on this issue and the fact that nearly every jurisdiction in the
Colonies and later in the Union had laws that limited the activity and
freedom of African-originated people who were not slaves.1ss In fact,
he cited several jurisdictions in northern states as well as southern
states that prohibited Negroes from performing certain activities,egr•s erfo in 13
such as getting married or serving in the military, 13 that white
American citizens took for granted as a right or obligation of citizen-
ship. For example, a colonial Maryland law forbade interracial mar-
riage between free male Negroes and white women and also forbade
interracial marriage between white men and free Negro or mulatto
women.137  The penalty for entering into an interracial marriage
forced a free Negro spouse into slavery for life and mulatto spouse
into seven-year servitude, at the court's discretion."" For a similar of-
fense, in colonial Massachusetts, courts heaped a fifty pound fine
upon those who transgressed.3 9 Moreover, these laws remained in
effect after the Revolutionary War.14 Neither the Declaration of In-
dependence nor the various state constitutions substantially changed
the tone of the relationship between the white race of citizens
and the [race] which they had reduced to slavery, and governed as
subjects with absolute and despotic power, and which they then
looked upon as so far below them in the scale of created beings,
that intermarriages between white persons and negroes [sic] or
mulattoes were regarded as unnatural and immoral, and punished as
crimes, not only in the parties, but in the person who joined them
in marriage. And no distinction in this respect was made between
the free negro [sic] or mulatto and the slave, but this stigma, of the
deepest degradation, was fixed upon the whole race."'
133. Id.
134. See generally i& at 405 (discussing the legal limitations on Blacks throughout the Un-
ion).
135. See id. at 416 (explaining that in 1822, Rhode Island passed a law strictly prohibiting
marriage between people of different races).
136. SeeDred Scott 60 U.S. at 415 (noting that in 1815, New Hampshire passed a law allowing
only free white men to serve).
137. Id. at 408.
138. Id.
139. Id. England seized them on the coast of Africa, and sold them or held them in slavery
for their own use; but they took them as ordinary articles of merchandise to every country where
they could make a profit on them, and were far more extensively engaged in this commerce
than any other nation in the world. The colonies continued the tradition. Id.
140. Id.
141. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 409 (emphasis added). The Court used the term "unnatural" to
describe the act of interracial marriage with similar disdain as Blackstone's Commentary used
the term "unnatural" to describe the love relationships between same-sex partners.
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Justice Taney surmised that the framers believed that Negroes
were inferior to white people, and that being of an inferior breed,
the Negro has no right that a white man must respect.42 Therefore,
Taney concluded that founders of the United States in general and
the Constitution's framers specifically, did not intend that Negroes
would be citizens regardless of the Negro's condition of servitude.4 '
The Dred Scott decision had a lasting social impact on the United
States long after the Civil War.'" During Reconstruction, "Congress
frequently stated that the purpose of constitutional reform was to
cure, as they called it, 'Dred Scott-itus'."'" "Dred Scott-itus" was not
cured, however. Instead, the affirmation of the inherent inferiority
of African-originated peoples, nurtured so vociferously by the Taney
Court, was like raw sewage poured into the stream of civic, economic,
social, and political consciousness in the United States. Dred Scott-
itis seeped into every aspect of African-American life regardless of
Congess' passin a arently radical legislation'4 and in spite of rati-C  gr e s  as i g p ,4 
fying the Thirteenth, Fourteenth,1" and Fifteenth 9 Amendments
142. Id.
143. Id. Having determined that Negroes could not be citizens of the United States, Justice
Taney offered his infamous holding in a seven-to-two split decision. A comprehensive and suc-
cinct reading of the holding in Dred Scott is found in Harriet Scott's dismissal, which reads:
1. Congress had no authority to eliminate slavery in any of the federal territories;
2. Dred Scott was not a citizen of the United States, nor was he permitted to use the
courts of the United States to sue for his freedom;
3. Because Congress had no authority to eliminate slavery in the federal territories and
because Dred Scott was not a citizen of the United States, the federal courts did not
have jurisdiction over Dred Scott's claim;
4. Dred Scott's residency in free territory did not make him free because the 1820 Mis-
souri Compromise violated the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause by depriving
slaveholders of their property;,
5. Scott's residence in another state, Illinois, had no effect on his status as a slave once
he returned to Missouri, at which point Missouri law, not Illinois law, applied.
Id. The case itself makes only passing mention of Dred Scott's wife and children. Id. The case
makes no reference to the strong arguments of Harriet Scott's case. The Dred Scott opinion does
not take into consideration the state of Dred Scott's health, nor the likelihood that the family
would be broken apart and each member sold to the highest bidder.
144. SeeVandervelde & Subramanian, supra note 12, at 1033.
145. SeeVandervelde & Subramanian, supra note 12, at 1033 n.3 (citation omitted).
146. For example, after Congress passed the Thirteenth Amendment, "Black codes" were
adopted by southern states. These codes effectively nullified the Thirteenth Amendment's
prohibition against slavery. SeeJON E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
369 (5th ed. 1995). In response, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which granted
citizenship to all people, regardless of race. See id. at 369 n.1.
147. The Thirteenth Amendment prohibited involuntary servitude and was ratified in 1865.
Id. at 369. It reads as follows: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment
for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United
States, or any place subject to theirjurisdiction." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
148. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibited states from abridging "the privileges or immu-
nities of citizens of the United States." See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 146, at 370 n.9
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to the United States Constitution.
DRED SCOTT V. SANDFORD AND BOWERS V. HARDWICK COMPARED
Ironically, in the Dred Scott decision, the United States Supreme
Court determined that, because the nation's founders had not envi-
sioned the inclusion of a certain class of people, Negroes, as mem-
bers of the community of citizens, "the special rights and immunities
guarantied to citizens do not apply to them."'50 The similarities to Bow-
ers v. Hardwick, are indeed startling. In Dred Scott, Justice Taney used
history and tradition as proof that the class of persons in question do
not deserve citizens' rights.'-' First, Justice Taney emphasized that
northern states had prohibitions or restrictions on marriage, serving
in the military, attending school, and/or voting rights leveled against
152African-originated people.
Secondly, Justice Taney held that, in his interpretation of the
original intent of the Constitution framers, their silence essentially
dis-included Negroes from citizenship. 3 The Court violently ab-
sconded with the Negro's full citizenship and replaced it with unen-
viable prospects of periodic gratuitous dispensations from those who
are empowered by the violence of its law. The Dred Scott decision re-
flects the attitude that Negroes have no rights that a white man is
bound to respect. That is, Negroes have no enforceable rights under
federal law.
Similarly, the Bowers v. Hardwick opinion specifically, and anti-
sodomy laws generally, have become acceptable rationale for lesbigay
disenfranchisement, and codes for the official, if tacit, approval of
the denigration of lesbigay people.
It is a travesty ofjustice, but well within Taney's reading of the law,
that the name, Dred Scott, now reflects the very textual reading
which systematically silenced him as a plaintiff. This is a lingering
(explaining and citing to U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV). The amendment further provided that
equal protection and due process of the laws, as stated in the Fifth Amendment, shall apply to
the states. Id. at 370 n.10.
149. U.S. CONST. amend. XV. "The right of citizens to vote shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servi-
tude." Id.
150. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 422 (emphasis added).
151. See generally, id. at 407-27.
152. See generaily, id. at407-16.
153. See id. at 416-20. The Court further explained that Southern states would never have
agreed to ratify the Constitution if Blacks were given citizenship, because the South was so eco-
nomically dependent on slavery. Id.
154. See id. at 421 (explaining that Blacks are "marked and stigmatized" and could not possi-
bly enjoy the rights and privileges of citizens because to apply such a label to Blacks would be an
"abuse of terms").
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and ironic consequence of at least three judgment errors by the Dred
Scott Court. First, the Court presupposed that it understood the
founders' original intent toward African-originated people and the
possibility of full citizenship. The second judgment error occurred
when the Court automatically applied its perception of the founders'
intent to Scott's particular case, even assuming that the Court could
know the intent of the framers. The Court's third error occurred
when it inaccurately re-read constitutional text, suspending judg-
ment long enough to particularize this case in controversy.
Jacques Derrida's 5 deconstructive concept of "differance" could
have been useful to the Dred Scott Court in making a just decision.
Traces of the violence perpetrated against Dred Scott, his family, and
other African-originated people continues. However, the Thir-
teenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution partially mitigate the effects of the Taney Court's read-
ing.'s6 The Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, is also an attempt to
ameliorate. 7
A LIGHT SIGNALS THE DARK TUNNEL'S END
Hopefully, the recent Romer v. Evansl Supreme Court decision
will diminish the effect of Bowers v. Hardwick and spark its ultimate
demise.' 9 Quoting Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson,'60
Justice Kennedy's opinion in Romer admonished that the
"Constitution neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens....
155. See generally, SHARON CROWLEY, A TEACHER'S INTRODUCTION TO DECONSTRUCTION
(1989).Jacques Derrida is a professor of philosophy at the Ecole Normale Superieure in Paris,
France. Derrida developed a style or strategy of critical analysis called deconstructionism: a not
wholly formalizable ensemble of rules for reading, interpretation and writing. Id. at 1 (citation
omitted).
156. See supra notes 147-149 (discussing U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, and XV). At least
nominally, these amendments forbad slavery, offered citizenship, regardless of history of servi-
tude, and provided - to males - the right to vote. Sandford's attitude as sanctioned by the Taney
Court is still heard in some of the so-called "Welfare reform" rhetoric, in English-only debates,
in affirmative action debates, and reapportionment decisions. Aspects of Dred Scott v. Sandford
are still considered good law, in that the decision was never directly overturned. A more com-
plete discussion is beyond the scope of this text.
157. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in 42
U.S.C. 21). This Act expanded voting rights, provided for "injunctive relief against discrimina-
tion in places of public accommodation," forbad segregated facilities, and contained provisions
against discrimination in employment. Id.)
158. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996). Justice Kennedy wrote for the 6-3 majority, "[a] State cannot so
deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws." Id. at 1629 (emphasis added).
159. The decision in Bowers, was split by a 5-4 vote, signaling a rift in the Court over the issue
of lesbigay rights. Even Justice Powell, in his concurrence with the majority, went to great
lengths to opine that an anti-sodomy law that classified sodomy as a felony might constitute a
serious violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 215.
160. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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[justice Harlan's admonition] state[s] a commitment to the law's
neutrality where the fights of persons are at stake."161 As I shall ex-
plore later in this text, by restating Justice Harlan's century-old ad-
monition, Justice Kennedy voiced one ofJacques Derrida's requisites
for ajustjudgment.62
In Romer v. Evans, a proposed amendment to the Colorado Consti-
tution, "Amendment 2," would have denied legal recourse for dis-
crimination against lesbigay citizens. 16' The Court held that the
amendment was unconstitutional on equal protection grounds.'T
Justice Kennedy emphasized that "[i]f the adverse impact on the dis-
favored class is an apparent aim of the legislature, its impartiality
would be suspect.""' Moreover, after careful analysis, the Romer
Court found that Colorado's Amendment 2 was simultaneously "too
narrow and too broad."1't The Court accused proponents of
Amendment 2 of "identif[ying] persons by a single trait and then
deny[ing] them protection across the board. The resulting disquali-
fication of a class of persons from the right to seek specific protec-
tion from the law is unprecedented in our jurisprudence .,
we were not the first
Black woman white woman
altering course to fit ourjourney.
In this treacherous sea
even the act of turning
is almost fatally difficult
coming around full face
into a driving storm
putting an end to running
161. See Romner, 116 S. Ct. at 1623 (quoting Pessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896)
(Harlan, J., dissenting)). In Pessy, the majority upheld an Oregon statute requiring Blacks and
Whites to ride in separate railway cars. 163 U.S. at 550.
162. CORNELL, infra note 214, at 112-13.
163. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1623 (quoting Peesy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896)
(Harlan,J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 1629.
165. Id.. at 1627-28 (quoting United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 181
(1980) (StevensJ, concurring) (emphasis added)).
166. Id. at 1628.
167. Id. (emphasis added). The Court used the term "single trait" as opposed to a single
behavior or a set of behaviors. The Court suggests that it has noted and is responding to the
personhood of lesbigay citizens, not merely referring to a set of presumed actions, for example,
sodomy, but rather a state of being. Sodomy is often erroneously truncated into the lesbigay
orientation, becoming synonymous with it. Also, HIV/AIDS is often collapsed onto lesbigay
orientation for a similar purpose.
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before the wind.""
The Dred Scott decision may be compared to Colorado's proposed
Amendment 2. The similarity between Dred Scott and Romeris in their
common strategies for acquiring the total disenfranchisement of a
class of persons. On the other hand, while the Dred Scott Court's ra-
tionale was by nature retroactive to gain popular acquiescence, if not
respect, whereas Colorado's rationale in Romer was proactive to gain
the popular vote. Overall, despite similarities with Dred Scott, how-
ever, the Romer Court emphasized the importance of the "absence of
precedent for Amendment 2." 69 Why did the Romer Court take steps
to avoid the obvious comparison between issues inherent in Dred
Scott and those fundamental to Amendment 2? Are the proffered al-
ternative resolutions to the Bowers v. Hardwick opinion (notably the
question of privacy) any less malevolent?
Another set of questions sit in this author's lap, awaiting their turn
on the computer screen. Most of these questions were posed by in-
timate lesbian friends and are as follows: 'Vhy are you writing about
'sodomy'? I thought that it was a 'guy-thing'." "What does sodomy
have to do with us, anyway? It's not illegal in Ohio, is it?" I dislike
these questions more than I despise shepardizing or cite-checking.
These questions are perilously close to the heart of the matter. Like
RuthAnn Robson,7 ' I am studying and writing about how the rule of
men and law impacts upon lesbian survival.1 "By survival [Robson]
means: First, the very daily survival that depends on the necessities of
life like food, shelter, work, safety, and love... . Second, survival as
lesbians."7 I am also studying and writing for the planet's survival;
for our children; forjustice. I believe that the process of deconstruc-
tion can assist us in ferreting out these questions and raisons d'6tre
of sodomy. Toward this end, there is a huge amount of deconstruc-
tive re-reading to do.
I trace the curve of yourjaw
with a lover's finger
knowing the hardest battle
is only the first
how to do what we need for our living
168. AUDRELORDE, OURDEADBEHINDUs8-9 (1986).
169. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628 (emphasis added).
170. RUTHANNROBSON, LESBIAN (OUT)LAW: SURVIVAL UNDER THERULE OF AW, 11 (1992).
171. See id. (explaining that the United States legal system is a product of men's limited
grasp of the concerns of women, such that "their rule of law mirrors the concerns of the ruling
men").
172. See id. (emphasis added).
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with honor and in love 73
I am a student ofjustice, not merely law, though I am not yet a le-
gal expert. Nor do I claim particular expertise or uncommon
knowledge of philosophy, rhetoric, or critical analysis from which
spring Jacques Derrida's notions of deconstruction. 17" I am merely
and especially a seeker on a lesbian-feminist jurisprudential path.
Feeling the call of the winds of change flit by, momentarily lifting
the caul from our eyes, I tossed high in the air this text which may be
seeds of justice; such is my gift to the refreshing breeze. I hope to
find blooming wild flowers of justice in a fertile bed of law some-
where as we continue to traverse our destined to be chosen paths.
OVA
ffA, liimi
You have claimed me.
How shall I serve you such that you will be pleased?
How shall I honor you such that you will bless me?
How shall I remember you such that you will never forget me?
Show me, Sweet _fA,
Bearded Warrior Mother that you are
teach your child.
Show me in a flash of your lightning
Show me in a whirl of your wind storm and
in your gentle breeze
Rend from me all my chaff
Gently, Yansa. Gently.
Reward me with gifts from your opulent pocket
O16ya d6 kosi ji, OVA, Heepa-Hey!
Please, do not blow your blessings away
Wrap me in your rainbow
Let me know the quiet center of your storm
Protect me, OWA, I am your child
I am your child, _OA, bless me.
Modupu&6'7'
What is especially interesting about Qya in human context is her
refusal to stay out of the enclaves of cult and culture preempted by
173. SeeLORDE, supra note 168, at 13.
174. See infra Section entitled Philosophy of the Limit (explaining deconstruction).
175. HUFF, OYA, inBLACKLESBIANS DO NOTEXIST, supra note 1, at 6.
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male authority. "She has, potentially, a sharp tongue, which occa-
sionally she wields like a sword .... She's a revolutionary." ' Who is
likely to invest in this deconstructive process? Who on earth would
want, would advocate, would appeal and pray for such catastrophic
change? The spoilers? The non-sportsman-like losers? The disen-
franchised?
Deconstruction
Deconstruction is aligned with the marginalized.'" Whether the
marginalized should remain so is a question addressed via decon-
struction as justice.iH The term deconstruction refers most often to a
method or style of analysis in the field of criticism, although it origi-
nated in the field of architecture, and literally means "the undoing,
piece by piece, of a building or other construction such as a bridge
or a monument."'
One essayist defines deconstruction as a method of criticism
within the context of critical legal studies.' s Using techniques remi-
niscent of psychoanalysis, a deconstructive reading looks for mo-
ments when the "text deceive[s] the mind.... [D]econstruction in-
terrogate[s] a text, breaks through the defenses and reveal[s] a set of
binary oppositions, or conceptual dualisms : public/private, mascu-
line/feminine, same/other, true/false, central/peripheral."'"' The
text "implicitly favour[s] the validity of one of the poles of these du-
alisms at the expense of the other." '82 A deconstructive reading ex-
poses the favored, uncovers the hidden poles, and is obliged to do
more.
176. JUDITH GLEASON, DVA IN PRAISE OF THE GODDESS (1987). Q/a, the Yoruba oriA of sud-
den structural change -earthshaking change -windstorm change. Deep transformation is called
upon and called for here. In a private place, Oya transforms into an African water buffalo to
explore the forest. She scratches her hide against a tree to remove this garment before she
goes into town. _Oya is said to have grown a beard because of war. Often called Yansa, mother
of nine, .Qa has nine aspects, and rides the Odb QOa, (the River Niger). Q0a is a twister, a tor-
nado; She twists off the tops of trees. Oya means "She tore." She, the Great Tearer, rips things,
texts apart. Barriers are broken down. "[Sihe tears out the intestines of the liar... Oya guards
the road into the world and out of it." Id. at 2-12.
177. DECONSTRUGTION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE ix (Drucilla Cornell et al. eds.,
1992).
178. Id.
179. SeeKOHL, supra note 19, at 29.
180. David Jabbari, Critical Legal Studies: A Revolution in Legal Thought?, in REVOLUTIONS IN
LAWAND LGALTHOUGHT 153 (Zenon Bankowski & Neil MacCormick eds., 1991).
181. Id. at 155.
182. Id.
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The Philosophy of the Limit'o
After developing an ethical reading of deconstruction, relating it
to the philosophy of alterity, and exploring deconstruction's rela-
tionship to questions of ethics, justice, and legal interpretation, Pro-
fessor Drucilla Cornell renamed "deconstruction" as "the philosophy
of the limit."84 This new name
affords more precision and focus regarding the philosophy, and
more clearly articulates its significance to law... . [Cornell has re-
named deconstruction in order to show] the significance for legal
interpretation of Derrida's own understanding ofjustice as an apo-
rias that inevitably serves as the limit to any attempt to collapse
justice into positive law.Is
Comell's second reason for renaming deconstruction is to avoid
its typical classification as postmodern philosophy.187 Because of its
origins in aesthetics, deconstruction has been categorized and iden-
tified as postmodem." Postmodernity, from a philosophical per-
spective beclouds and may misrepresent the complexity of Denida's
work."" Perhaps a re-reading of deconstruction as the philosophy of
the limit could help us think about justice and legal interpretation
differently from the conceptions that have dominated analytic juris-
prudence and critical social theory. As I will argue, for marginalized
groups, this is a difference that makes a difference.' 90
I remember studying cases in property class which taught us that
to capture, to control, to kill a thing was great!19' To compete in or-
der to capture enhanced society.'2 If a person was cagey enough to
let others compete to capture and that person was present only for
the timely kill and ensuing possession, that was great, too.'93 But, if
183. DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE LIMrr (1992).
184. Id. at 1. Cornell relates that she felt compelled to rename deconstruction because
negative connotations are attached to it and misinterpretations of its meaning are common.
185. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICrIoNARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
UNABRIDGED 101 (Philip Babcock Gove ed., 1993) [hereinafter WEBSTER'S]. An aporia is a prob-
lem or difficulty arising from an awareness of opposing or incompatible views on the same theo-
retical matter, especially one giving rise to philosophically systematic doubt. An aporia is also a
"passage in speech or writing incorporating or presenting a difficulty or doubt." Id. Both defi-
nitions apply to Derrida's expressed understanding ofjustice.
186. SeeCORNELL, supra note 183, at 2.
187. SeeCORNELL, supra note 183, at 2.
188. See CORNELL, supra note 183, at 2.
189. See CORNELL, supra note 183, at 2.
190. See CORNELL, supra note 183, at 12.
191. See, e.g., Pierson v. Post, 2 Am. Dec. 264 (N.Y. 1805).
192. See e.g., Ghen v. Rich, 8 F. 159 (Dist. Mass. 1881).
193. Se? e.g., Pierso, 2 Am. Dec. at 264.
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someone warned and chased those geese away before they were cap-
tured by another, well that person was a spoiler, and that is bad.'4 I
also learned in property class that the power to own resides only in
the sovereign. 95 And therefore, only the sovereign, could say who or
what could own anything. No matter whether someone was in pos-
session, guarding, nurturing, improving, sharing, using an entity,
that person did not, could not own it unless the sovereign gave per-
mission. 96 The sovereign alone classified. Under this hierarchical
system, some of my ancestors were deemed ineligible to own property,
some of my ancestors were deemed to be property, and some of my an-
cestors were permitted to own property by this sovereign - property in-
cluded the two formerly described classes of ancestors. The audacity
of the sovereign gives one pause. Consequently, property class had
particularly personal meaning for me.'97
It really matters where you are standing as to how a legal principle
looks - what the text means in context can make a difference in your
life. Deconstruction is a strategic device for reading texts in such a
way as to rewrite them to give voice to that aspect of the text that has
been systematically silenced 98
SILENCE
Interrupt
Change the subject
cry
apologize
Deny deny deny
sometimes
silence
ain't Qiet
Deconstruction offers a strategy for exposing a fraud.2° In this
way, my grandmother deconstructed the daily newspaper and the
194. See, e.g., Keeble v. Hickeringill, 11 East 574 (Q.B. 1707).
195. Sew, e.g.,Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
196. Id.
197. This middle-aged student offers a note of gratitude to Professor Steven Lazarus and
Dean Frederick White for sharing their knowledge about property, from "adverse possession" to
"easements," and from the "Rule Against Perpetuity" to "the Rule in Shelley's Case." Professor
Lazarus, thanks much for the history and the conversation. Dean White, thanks much for
teaching me to keep on moving in a timely fashion.
198. SeeCROWILEY, supra note 155, at9.
199. SeeHUFF, Silence, inBLACKLESBIANSDONoTEXiSr, supranote 1, at 13.
200. See COGWLEY, supra note 155, at 7.
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evening news. By necessity, she re-read each news item to give voice
to an other side. She systematically filled in the blank spaces in the
broadcast and wrote "other" news in the margins of the newsprint
from the places where our lives and those of folks we knew resided.
Like Derrida, but for her own survival and mine, my grandmother
pointed out "the necessity with which what [the author] does see is sys-
tematically related to what [the author] does not see.""°' It is important
to notice that deconstruction does not merely "point out the flaws or
weaknesses of an author." °2 Many lesbigays deconstruct family and
the history of homosexuality for a similar purpose.0 Without de-
constructive strategic processes, dichotomous hierarchical principles
would render the systematically silenced into oblivion. In my unpub-
lished manuscript, Black Lesbians Do Not Exist,204 the title poem decon-
structs some conditions that have systematically silenced lives of Afri-
can-American lesbians. These ways of knowing are contextual.
Difference matters; differences make for a more complete knowing.
When women make love
beyond the first exploration
we meet each otherknowing
in a landscape
the rest of our lives
attempts to understand. 5
I remind the readers and myself that a deconstructive critical
analysis should not be confused with more traditional analytic or
critical readings of a text. A deconstructive reading seeks "places in
the text where a writer's language mis-speaks her, where she loses
control of her intention, where she says what she did not mean to
say."2 6 The reader must always aim at a certain relationship unper-
ceived by the writer, between what he commands and what he does
not command of the patterns of the language that he uses. 7
I learned to be honest
the way I learned to swim
dropped into the inevitable... 203
201. SeeCROWLEY, supra note 155, at 7 (quoting BarbaraJohnson, Derrida's translator).
202. SeeCROivLY, supra note 155, at 7.
203. SeeROBSON, supranote 170, at 11.
204. See HUFF, Black Lesbians Do Not Exist, in BLACK LESBIANS Do NOT ExIsr, supra note 1, at
33.
205. SeeLORDE, supra note 168, at 11.
206. See CROWLEY, supra note 155, at 7.
207. See CROiWE, supra note 155, at 7.
208. &eLORDE, supra note 168, at 39.
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Addressing the terms law and justice in a deconstructive context,
Jacques Derrida exposes the reader to notions of force, enforce, vio-• ~209 ..
lence, impotence. Justice without force is impotent, but the mere• . • 210
force of law is not justice. According to Cornell, Dernida distin-
guishes law-making or founding violence from law-preserving or con-
serving violence.21 ' Derrida ponders force without justice; justice
without force; just-ness as right-ness; just-ness as necessity.2 2  As a
starting point, Derrida states that it seems just to renderjustice:
[I]n a language in which all the 'subjects' concerned are suppos-
edly ompetent, that is, capable of understanding and interpreting-
all the 'subjects,' that is, those who establish the laws, those who
judge and those who are judged, witnesses in both the broad and
narrow sense, all those who are guarantors of the exercise of [law] .213
Cornell asks, for example, is it just to require that a woman
"translate her harm into the terms of [a male-oriented] system" like
pregnancy or breast cancer into hernia or prostate cancer text? 214
Cornell's example brings to light the fact that the United States legal
system is a product and tool of white patriarchy.215 Law is decon-
structible. For those who are not white, heterosexual, christian
males, justice can come through deconstruction. Derrida reasons as
follows:
The structure I am describing here is a structure in which law
(droit) is essentially deconstructible, whether because it is founded,
constructed on interpretable or transformable textual strata (and
that is the history of law [droit], its possible and necessary trans-
formation, sometimes its amelioration), or because its ultimate
foundation is by definition unfounded. The fact that law is decon-
structible is not bad news. We may even see in this a stroke of luck
for politics, for all historical progress. But the paradox that I'd like
209. SeegeneraUy, CORNELL, supra note 183, at 155-58.
210. See CORNELL, supra note 183, at 157 (suggesting that law is transcendent and is de-
pendent on who is before the law, who uses it, and who creates it. Derrida also suggests that
since law is often presently made, interpretation of the law is often left to those who apply it in
the future. Id.).
211. See CORNELL, supra note 183, at 157-58 (contrasting Der-ida from other philosophers
who see law as consenting violence).
212. Jacques Den-ida, Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority," in DECON.
STRUCTIONAND THE POSSmBILITYOFJUSTICE 17-36 (Drucilla Cornell et al eds., 1992).
213. Id. at 16.
214. CORNELL, BEYOND ACCOMMODATION 114 (1991). CorneU provides this example:
women must often draw analogies of female-oriented health issues, such as pregnancy, with a
male-defined health disorder to receive the same health benefits as men. Id. She also suggests
that one reason women must explain themselves as they relate to men is often simply an issue of
cost-effectiveness. Id.
215. See generally, ROBSON, supranote 170, at 11.
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to submit for discussion is the following: it is the deconstructible
structure of law (droit), or if you prefer ofjustice as droit, that also
insures the possibility of deconstruction. Justice in itself, if such a
thing exists, outside or beyond law, is not deconstructible. No
more than deconstruction itself, if such a thing exists.216
Justice occurs in the context of freedom - an act cannot be just or
unjust without freedom, but a just act also must follow law. This
217
constitutes the first of three aporias, identified by Derrida. Only a
fresh judgment is just. That is, the judge must not merely follow a
rule of law, but must also "assume it, approve it, confirm its value, by
a reinstituting act of interpretation as if ultimately nothing previ-
ously existed of the law, as if the judge himself invented the law in
every case."21 8 Derrida's second aporia is related to the first-that a
219just decision is one that divides. It is the obligation to "give itself up
to the impossible decision, [the undecidable,] while taking account
of law and rules."'' 0 It is the travail of the undecidable that makes a
free decision instead of a merely preset automated unjust judg-
ment.
221
A Black woman and a white woman
in the open fact of our loving
with not only our enemies'hands
raised against us
means a gradual sacrifice
of all that is simple...22
Den-ida's third aporia is the "urgency that obstructs the horizon of
knowledge."2 2 Justice doesn't wait.224 "[A] just decision is always re-
quired immediately, right away."2 According to Derrida, justice must
not wait.226  Rather than a gratuitous response to a mis-perceived
failure or inadequacy of the other, judgment without translation is
216. See CORNELL, supra note 214, at 14-15..
217. See Derrida, supra note 212, at 22.
218. Se Derrida, supra note 212, at 23-24.
219. SeeDerrida, supra note 212, at 24.
220. See Derrida, supra note 212, at 24.
221. See CORNELL, supra note 214, at 114-15 (explaining that the ideal situation is never pos-
sible. Moreover, there is great injustice in so subjecting one who does not understand the lan-
guage of the law, as it was created by white men in a white man's world.)
222. SeeLORDE, supra note 168, at 9 (emphasis added).
223. SeeDerrida, supra note 212, at 26.
224. SeeDerrida, supra note 212, at 26.
225. SeeDerrida, supra note 212, at 26.
226. See Derrida, supra note 212, at 26.
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the obligation of the just judge and all who participate.2 Justice
seems to be a leap into that moment of fresh judgment - the fu-
ture. M
Yet, the ideal eludes at the limit. Cornell argues that it is the phi-
losophy of the limit which "gives us the politics of utopian possibility.
[T]he philosophy of the limit, and more specifically the deconstruc-
tion of the privileging of the present, protects the possibility of radi-
cal legal transformation."m But there is no guarantee; only a projec-
tion; only a possibility. Cornell exjlains that "[1l]aw never can catch
up with its projected justification." To recapitulate, while law is de-
constructiblejustice is deconstruction, and hence optimistic and fu-
ture-focused."
i keep the pleasures of my life from me.
Not
this
time.
This time I will not take my joy from me. 2"
As discussed earlier, Derrida conceptualizes two distinct yet mutu-
ally contaminating forms of violence - violence that serves to create
law and violence that conserves law.23 Derrida refers to this as the
"mystical foundation of authority."2 For the sake ofjustice, the na-
ture of this foundation must be admitted; once admitted, it must be
remembered. Cornell warns, however, that collapsing justice into
law would create a monstrous self-replicating machine that seeks to
• • 235 •.
erase the knowledge of the mystical foundation. The possibility of
justice remains if "deconstruction does not reduce itself to the most
recent and sophisticated brand of legal positivism which ... asserts
227. See CORNELL, supra note 214, at 114-116 (emphasizing that lawyers and law professors
are essential to meeting this obligation ofjustice).
228. &eDerrida, supra note 212, at 23.
229. See CORNELL, supra note 183, at 156 (distinguishing "philosophy of the limit" from the
evolution of the existing legal system).
230. See CORNELL, supra note 183, at 157-58 (explaining that even anti-deconstructionists
readily admit that the law can never catch up with its justifications).
231. But see CORNELL, supra note 183, at 158-59 (contrasting her view with that of legal theo-
rists who believe justification for decisions should be based on two precursors. First, "original
foundation," which relates to the intentions of the founding fathers. Id. The second is the
"idea of full readability," or interpreting laws in the plain meaning of their language. Id.).
232. See HUFF, Sometimes IKep, in BLACKLESBIANS DO NOT EXIST, supra note 1, at 25.
233. See CORNELL, supra note 183, at 156 (distinguishing "lawmaking or founding violence"
from "law preserving or conserving force").
234. SeeDerrida, supranote 212, at 12.
235. &e CORNELL, supra note 183, at 158 (disagreeing with the notion that the legal system
should set the limits of relevance).
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that might does indeed make right."m The deconstructive process is
not destruction.
WAKE UP!
even you who prepares the road
Clears the path
creates the tools and dominates their use
Even you,
Great Forger of Iron
With your Badd Blacksmith-self
arms bulging from here to yonder
sweat pouring down your face
while your hammer and anvil reshape history
Even you
Gun neatly polished;
trigger at the ready
wars erupting; swords clashing;
Ikd 2" standing by
Even you, Ogdn,
The Great Hunter, the first to eat;
blood dripping down your chin
spraying your scar-covered body.
Even you, Ogi6n,
must recognize
and honor
OUR MOTHERSO'
In this Ogdnland, when some people think of sodomy they think
of the Bible, but when I think of sodomy, I think of slavery. The ul-
timate whip against men, women, boys, girls. A veritable smorgas-
236. SeeCORNELL, supranote 183, at 158.
237. JOHN MASON, OPIN OR1SA 88 (1992). Ogdn is an briA of the Yoruba Religion. An 6risl
is a diet,; most 6iflA have more than one aspect.
238. DICTIONARY OF MODERN YORfiBA 298 (1st ed. 1958). In the Yor-6bd language, Ik-d
means "death." For the Yorfibg, ik is an OriA.
239. See HUFF, Wake Up, in BIACKLESBIANS DO NOT EXIST, supra note 1, at 7. See HENRYJOHN
DREWAL & MARGARET THOMPSON DREWAL, GELEIEART AND FEMALE POWER AMONG THE YORUBA
9 (1990). Our Mothers - Awon lyi Wa, is the Yorfabd term for the power of the feminine life
force which transforms itself into birds that fly at night into your bed, into the unconscious, or
where ever else they please. This morally neutral power, ajM, is wielded by women, particularly
by older women, iyA AgbA, and is highly respected by all.
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bord of abuse. "[Folks that commanded and demanded whatever,
whoever they wanted, whenever wherever it pleased."240
SODOMY
Blackstone described 'the infamous crime against nature' as an of-
fense of deeper malignity than rape, a heinous act, the very men-
tion of which is a disgrace to human nature, and 'a crime not fit to
be named.' 24'
The original title of this paper was "A Poetic Deconstruction of
Sodomy: What the Fuck Is It?" This fantasized title was born while I
was in a Women and Law class at Cleveland-Marshall College of Law.
While discussing the ramifications of Bowers v. Hardwick2 on the lives
of women, a student whispered in an agitated, if not excited utter-
ance, "What the fuck is sodomy, anyway?" A hush filled the class-
room of fewer than twenty students. Noting the discomfort of nearly
everyone including the professor, I explained that in the particular
case of Michael Hardwick, Officer Torrick entered Hardwick's home
on a summer morning, found his bedroom, and observed Hardwick
engaging in mutual oral sex with a consenting adult male friend.2 " A
student in the back of the class mumbled incredulously, "Oh, man.
Is that all?" Muted nervous laughter filled the room and the tension
of the moment dissipated. r
The fact that individuals define themselves in a significant way
through their sexual relationships suggests, in a Nation as diverse as
ours, that there may be many right ways of conducting those rela-
tionships, and that much of the richness of a relationship will come
from the freedom an individual has to choose the form and nature of
these intensely personal bonds.244
That our professor was temporarily taken aback at the prospect of
enunciating the elements of the crime of sodomy is not surprising.
This extremely competent professor was up for tenure and her oth-
erwise relaxed classroom was being observed by two rather reserved,
tenured, European-American male (and presumably heterosexual)
law professors. One misplaced word about sodomy in this setting
240. HUFF, Poems for a Man Who Isn't Really My Uncle: Nine Questions From Oya - Question # 1:
Who Did t?, in BLACK LESBIANS Do NOT EXIST, supra note 1, at 50.
241. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 197 (Burger, J., concurring) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACESTONE,
COMMENTARIES 215). ChiefJustice Burger also noted that Roman Law prohibited homosexual
sodomy and that such acts were againstJudeo-Christian morals and ethical beliefs. Id.
242. See id. at 186.
243. See Irons, supranote 32, at 125, 127.
244. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 205 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (reiterating his view that
the case was not about homosexual sodomy, but the right to be let alone).
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may have placed her at risk of losing her opportunity to gain the
tenure that she deserved, despite the fact that Ohio has no statute
prohibiting sodomy." In a Derridan sense, we were all "before the
law " 2 as our class attempted to make sense of sodomy. And what
does sodomy have to do with women and the law?
Consider the following Biblical passage:
[4] But before they lay down, the men of the city, even the men of
Sodom, compassed the house round, both old and young, all the
people from every quarter: [5]And they called unto Lot, and said
unto him, Where are the men which came in to thee this night?
Bring them out unto us, that we may know them. [6] And Lot
went out at the door unto them, and shut the door after him, [7]
And said, I pray you, brethren, do not so wickedly. [8] Behold
now, I have two daughters which have not known man; let me, I pray you,
bring them out unto you, and do ye to them as is good in your eyes. only
unto these men do nothing; for therefore came they under the
shadow of my roof.247
Women are marginalized in discussions regarding sodomy. Based
on biblical mythology, rape, even gang rape, perpetrated upon vir-
ginal daughters who have been offered up by their father, is a lesser
crime or no crime at all. Actually, it is unclear from the biblical
text to what acts Lot's daughters would have been subjected had the
crowd accepted Lot's offer. It is clear, however, that Lot had the
prerogative to make the offer. Based on this same mythology, incest
between a father and his two daughters is also less infamous.
Sometimes I hold
my warm seed
up to my mouth
very close
to my parched lips
and whisper
I'm sorry,
before I turn my hand
245. OnIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2905.44 (Baldwin 1996) (repealing an anti-sodomy statute).
246. See CORNELL, supra note 183, at 159 (describing how the two men in Bowers were caught
engaging in sodomy without realizing they would be subject to judicial scrutiny).
247. Genesis 19:4-8 (KingJames version) (emphasis in original).
248. This phenomenon is implied in Lot's words, when he offered to sacrifice his virgin
daughters to the men. Id.
249. See Genesis 19:30-38 (King James version). The story of Lot continues with his two
daughters "laying down" with their father to "preserve seed" so that Lot could have male chil-
dren through them. The story contains an eerie twist, in that Lot gets drunk and supposedly
sleeps with his daughters without considering the incestuousness of his actions.
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over the toilet
and listen to the seed
splash into the water.
I rinse what remains
down the drain,
dry my hands -
they return
to their tasks
as if nothing
out of place
has occurred.
I go on being,
wearing my shirts
and trousers,
voting, praying,
paying rent,
pissing in public,
cussing cabs,
fussing with utilities.
What I learn
as age advances
relentless pillager,
is that we shrink
inside our shirts
and trousers,
or we spread
beyond the seams.
The hair we cherished
disappears.
Sometimes I hold
my warm seed
up to my mouth
and kiss it.L
A common misperception persists that sodomy is an act that
women simply do not or cannot perform.2" The following defini-
250. ESSEX HEMPHILL, Rights andPemasons, in CEREMONIES: PROSE AND POETRY 67 (1992).
251. See ROBSON, supra note 170, at 80.
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tions of sodomy support this perception: "the crime of Sodom;"
"sexual intercourse between men;" "sexual intercourse between a
man and an animal;" and "buggery."H2 Other definitions include,
"any sexual intercourse held to be abnormal, especially bestiality or
anal intercourse between two male persons."2s However persistent
the misperception, neither case law nor statutory law support a fe-
male exemption from the rule of law regarding sodomy.Z
Confusion as to the meaning of sodomy is not new. It was evident
in perhaps the first debate in American law over the scope of its
definition: in the winter of 1641 - 1642, a sodomy case arose in the
Massachusetts Bay Colony. Three men were discovered to have
had sexual contact with two female children. John Winthrop's ac-
count of the case described the act as 'agitation and effusion of
seed.' ... [N]on-penetrative acts which led to ejaculation and the
'spilling of seed' were comparable in infamy to penetrative crimes
and should be equally punished. As one minister put it, the spill-
ing of seed 'is equivalent to killing the man who could have been
born out of it.'2
Although the actual activity perpetrated by the three Massachu-
setts Bay Colony men is unclear, we do know that the acts of sodomy
were perpetrated upon two female children. The issues of whether
ejaculation and/or penetration occurred were raised and debated in
order to determine whether the men should be sentenced to
death.2- This reads like a case of child sexual abuse, involving, per-
haps, anal rape or oral/genital contact.
The current edition of Black's Law Dictionay broadened these ear-
lier definitions, acknowledging that sodomy, "[wihile variously de-
fined in state criminal statutes, is generally oral or anal copulation
between humans, or between humans and animals."257 That diction-
ary also cites to an early case, State v. Young,8 in which Young appeals
252. WEBSTER'S NEv TW'ENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UN-
ABRIDGED 1612 (revised ed. 1951). "Buggery" is defined tautologically as "sodomy." Id. at 226.
Although this definition was propounded in 1951, misperceptions on the definition of sodomy
are the product of a combination of past writings and present definitions.
253. WEBSTR'S NEV WORLD DIGTIONARY OF AMERICAN ENGUSH 1274 (3rd college ed.
1988). Even definitions promulgated in the 1980s specify only men as engaging sodomy.
254. SRoBSoN, supra note 170, at 47-59.
255. Nan D. Hunter, LdfeAJferHardwick, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 531,533 (1992) (quoting
JOHN WINTHROP, THE HISTORY OF NEW ENGLAND FROM 1630 TO 1649: VOLUME II 54 - 55
(1853)) (citations omitted).
256. Id. (describing how colonists could not agree on what type of acts would be punishable
by death. Furthermore, the colonists lacked any statutory definitions for sodomy, so they had to
find a definition from the Bible and English common law.).
257. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1391 (6th ed. 1990).
258. See State v. Young, 13 P.2d 604 (Or. 1932).
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from a conviction for the "crime of sodomy, or the crime against na-
ture."' 9 Young quotes Anderson's Dictionary of Law definition of
"sodomy" as:
'carnal copulation,' by human beings with each other against na-
ture, or with a beast. Named from the prevalence of the sin in
Sodom. The infamous crime against nature ; ... an offense of so
dark a nature, so easily charged, and the negative so difficult to be
proved, that the accusation should be clearly made out.2"
In this case, Young and Lucile Howard, his female companion,
were arrested after police officers came to their hotel room door.61
When Young came to the door, an officer shoved his foot in the door
and walked in. After the officer looked for a woman and found
Lucile Howard, he arrested them both for commission of "the un-
speakable crime hereinbefore named."2 3 Howard pled guilty and
264testified against Young. In her testimony, Howard explained that
Young urged her to "go down on him," stating that "he had been
frenched so much that he wasn't much good any other way."26 5 She
also testified that she had heard that it "was fashionable" and
"everybody does it."266 Although there was considerable evidence to
suggest Young was actually executing a plan to take Howard across
state lines for purposes of prostitution, no charges were filed against
him for prostitution, but Howard was referred to as his "accomplice"
in sodomy.
267
There are three aspects of this case that are immediately striking.
First, Howard pled guilty to the charge of committing the unspeak-
able act. As a direct result of pleading guilty, the court gave Howard
carte blanche before the law to graphically describe the most inti-
268
mate details of this unspeakable crime. In fact, on those occasions
while testifying, when Howard demonstrated modesty or reserve, the
court encouraged her to provide detailed explicit answers. Sec-
ondly, as a participant, Howard was the only witness who could de-
259. Id.
260. Id. at 607.
261. Id. at 605. Howard testified that she and Young were sexually involved on more than
one occasion. Id.
262. Id.
263. See Young, 13 P.2d at 605 (referring to the act of sodomy betweenYoung and Howard).
264. Id.
265. Id. at 606.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 607.
268. &e Young 13 P.2d at 605-606.
269. Id. at 605.
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scribe the actual sodomic acts that she herself performed in violation
of the law. But for her2 ilty plea, she would have been the primary
witness against herself. In this case the woman who actually per-
formed the unspeakable crime, is referred to diminuitively as a weak
and sinful girl and regarded as a mere accomplice, while her male
partner remained the referent2I
Then a lawyer said, But what of our Laws, master? And he an-
swered: You delight in laying down laws, Yet you delight more in
breaking them.... But what of those to whom life is a rock, and
the law a chisel with which they would carve it in their own like-
ness? What of the old serpent who cannot shed his skin, and calls
all others naked and shameless? And of him who comes early to
the wedding-feast, and when over-fed and tired goes his way saying
that all feasts are violation and all feasters lawbreakers? What shall
I say of these save that they too stand in the sunlight, but with their
backs to the sun? They see only only their shadows, and their
shadows are their laws. 2
A deconstructive reading of Young reveals Young and Howard jux-
taposed as text. Derrida has reminded us how to read the text: every
text includes unconscious traces of other positions, some exactly op-
posite to that which it sets out to uphold. Deconstruction is, among
other things, "a theory of reading and writing."273 These "straw bina-
ries" are hierarchical and oppositional:27 4 bad/good, male/female,
heterosexual/homosexual. They re-enforce and enliven each other.
An expression of the paradox occurred during a tense moment in
the Senate gay-ban hearing when Strom Thurmond shouted,
"Heterosexuals don't practice sodomy, 275 as he attempted to control
the gay-ban debate with the sheer force of his lawful perspective.
"But when the shadow solidifies as law, the over-fed, tired one of old
can don it. Only then can the imperial guard proclaim the em-
peror's new cloak, compelling all to see and believe as though it were
so."
276
270. In fact, without Howard's testimony, the prosecutor had very little evidence upon which
to base the state's case. Id.
271. Id. at 609.
272. KAHLLGIBRAN, TIE-PROPHr44-45 (1923).
273. See CROwLEY, supra note 155, at xv.
274. See CROWLEY, supra note 155, at xv.
275. Senator Loudly Debate Gay Ban, N.Y. TIMEs, May 8, 1993, at Ag. The audience laughed
at this comment. Id. Senator Kerry, a war veteran, stated that he felt the ban on gays and lesbi-
ans was fundamentally wrong. Id. He further noted that there are homosexuals in Congress
and they have not been arrested for violating anti-sodomy laws. Id. Thurmond's response was
that those Congressmembers should be arrested if they committed sodomy. Id.
276. Leslye M. Huff, Just Unlawful Poems, unpublished law school poem journal, on file with
the author.
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I am reminded here of Derrida's admonishment and Cornell's
warning: firstjudgment without translation is the obligation of ajust
judgment and second, it is inherently violent to be "before the
law."M Violence also inheres outside the law, beside the law, as well
as behind the law. Once the force of law is engaged, it seems un-
stoppable despite reasoned criticism, without apparent conse-
quences.m In Bowers v. Hardwick, Justice White's opinion that the
state of Georgia had a right to its criminal sodomy law as applied to
homosexuals still has the force of law.2 '
Legal interpretation, whether statutory or constitutional, functions
primarily through two myths that purport to legitimize law by finding
its source.m The first is the myth of the intent of the founding fa-
thers - the knowable original foundation.28 ' In Bowers v. Hardwick,
Justice White thrusts this myth upon the very silence of the framers
of the United States Constitution regarding the rights of homosexu-
282
als. The second myth is the plain meaning of the words or "the
myth of full readability."'Justice White interpreted the founders si-
lence to mean that if the matter is not included in the Constitution,
the founders did not want it included. 2 4 For every canon of statutory
or constitutional interpretation, there is an opposite canon. Justice
White chose his interpretation - a violent choice to conserve the legal
status quo.2 It was not just. Whether one uses one canon or an-
other is based on one's own evaluation of the matter. Cornell ex-
plains that "interpretation is also evaluation."216
That Justice White used the silence of the founders concerning
homosexuality to support his opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick, flies in
the face of the United States Constitution's Ninth Amendment,
which states that "[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by
277. &eCORNELL, supra note 183, at 159.
278. SeeCORNELL, supra note 183, at 159.
279. &e CORNELL, supra note 183, at 159. See Bower, 478 U.S. at 191 (espousing the major-
ity's view that the Court would not recognize a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sod-
omy).
280. S&eCORNELL, supra note 183, at 161.
281. Se CORNELL, supra note 183, at 161.
282. Se Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191.
283. See CORNELL, supra note 183, at 161. Significantly, the Supreme Court can and has
changed the law and has given new interpretations to the meaning of the Constitution. The
Court could have found a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sexual behavior.
284. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191 (stating that the right to engage in homosexual acts of sod-
omy is "not readily identifiable in the Constitution's text").
285. Id. at 194.
286. SeeCORNELL, supra note 183, at 161.
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the people."2 7 The deconstructibility of law allows for the possibility of
deep structural change and allows for the possibility of justice. I as-
sess the Justices' efforts to meet their responsibility to justice by their
openness to transformation.m The Ninth Amendment should be
understood as institutional humility before the call tojustice. 9 Jus-
tice White constructed his opinion on a tautological framework in-
stead of on inclusive affirmative conditions that fosterjustice."
In a deconstructive sense, Justice White failed in his obligation to
justice as aporia. First,Justice White failed to make a fresh judgment
in the midst of the paradox. He merely described the state of the
law as he understood it over the last century, which does not consti-
tute judging anew. Secondly, Justice White failed to traverse the un-
decidable, where no moment holds a fully just decision and yet, one
perseveres for justice sake. Thirdly, Justice White failed to acknowl-
edge the urgent need for justice that inhered in the issues compris-
ing Bowers v. Hardwick, which would impel him to take a leap of faith
for justice.
Libation
We are the generation
of woman who must use
the lightning that we have
so carefully stored under
our tongues. We must speak
our words of power with a certainty
of our inextricable oneness with the
Powers of Our Mothers; With a certainty
that We can, will, do change things.
It is our task, our duty
to unleash the power of
profound structural change.
cosmetic change
will no longer
287. U.S. CONsT. amend. IX (emphasis added). See CORNELL, supra note 183, at 164
(emphasizing Cornell's view that "[tihe Ninth Amendment can and ... should be interpreted to
attempt fidelity to the deconstructibility of even the 'best' constitution, so as to allow for histori-
cal change in the name ofJustice").
288. SeeCORNELL, supra note 183, at 165-67.
289. See CORNELL, supranote 183, at 166.
290. See CORNELL, supra note 183, at 164 (stating that "the tautology upon which Justice
White's opinion rests - that the law is and therefore isjustified to be, because it is - is exposed as
tautology rather than justification").
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suffice.
Ae2
l
I want a deconstructive reading of sodomy that shakes things up
and shifts the momentum so that, perhaps somewhere in the future,
Justice will appear, because we need it now. That men have consis-
tently been the primary focus of sodomy laws is not likely to be de-
bated. Perhaps a shift toward a more egalitarian focus will assist us
along our path. Nan Hunter posits that
the term sodomy is a cultural chameleon, which has shifted in
meaning from its original delineations based primarily on non-
procreative sex to a contemporary view that reflects social anxiety
over sexual orientation.... This phenomenon is now confusing
Equal Protection doctrine, and it necessitates a gay-friendly decon-
struction of the new sexual orientation categories.m
The shift in sodomy laws has been multifaceted. In the early
1960s, everyjurisdiction in the United States had a sodomy law which
criminalized certain sexual behaviors. These sexual behaviors were
often vaguely defined, but they concentrated on the act rather than
the actor.2 14 In 1961, Illinois became the first state to repeal its sod-
omy law, and ten years later, Connecticut followed.- 5 More that
twenty states followed Connecticut. 6 The momentum of the repeal
effort slowed and culminated in 1983 when Wisconsin became the
last repealing state to date. Instead of repealing sodomy statutes,
many state legislatures amended them to only prohibit same-sex oral
or anal sex.297 Sodomy law specification replaced the tendency to re-
peal.29
8
Courts responded and shifted in their application of sodomy laws.
For example, an Oklahoma appellate court reversed a conviction for
maiming and "crime against nature," based on the appellant's claim
that the sodomy statute "as applied to non-violent consensual activity
between adults in private, violates his right to privacy under the
United States Constitution."2 The trial court acquitted the defen-
291. &_eHUFF, Libation, inBiAcKLESBIANS Do NoTEXIsr, supra note 1, at5.
292. &eHunter, supra note 255, at 531-32.
293. See LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE LAW, supra note 23, at 87, 92 n.1 (reporting that in
1961, Illinois was the first state to repeal its sodomy law).
294. &e Hunter, supra note 255, at 532.
295. SeeLESBIANS, GAYMEN, AND THE LAW, supra note 23, at 92 nn.1, 2.
296. See LESBIANS, GAYMENAND THE LIAW, supra note 23, at 92 n.l.
297. See LESBIANS, GAYMEN, AND THE LAW, supra note 23, at 92 nn.1, 2.
298. See LESBIANS, GAYMEN, AND THE LAW, supra note 23, at 92 nn.1, 2.
299. Oklahoma v. Post, 715 P.2d 1105, 1106-07 (Okla. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 890
(1986).
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dant of rape, but convicted him of two counts of crime against na-
ture, for anal and oral penetration, and one count of maiming, for
severely beating the victim, blinding her, and causing eye loss.5 ° In
1986, the same year that Bowers v. Hardwick came before the Court,
the United States Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari in this
Oklahoma case.'lThis treatment of Oklahoma's sodomy law and the
unwisely decided Bowers v. Hardwick opinion taken together send a
clear message that the Bowers Court intended sodomy laws to be ap-
102plied almost exclusively to homosexual sexual relationships. Given
the continued male reference point, lesbian sexual encounters are
lost. Are our relationships brought before the law or are we outside
of the rule of law?
Lesbians are marginalized in discussions regarding women, men,
and sodomy. Yet virtually all the jurisdictions that have maintained
sodomy statutes apply them to lesbians.""3 In fact, the language of
many of these laws has not improved since Blackstone's Commentaries.
To more accurately reflect lesbians' relationship to current sodomy
statutes, Ruthann Robson takes a lesbian-centered approach.' 4 Rob-
son refers to the sodomy statutes as "lesbian sex statutes," but warns
that "the statutes, individually and collectively, are idiosyncratic in
their application to various expressions of lesbian sexuality."
3 5
I am a bleak heroism of words
that refuse
to be buried alive
with the liars.06
To spend the lion's share of the fourteenth anniversary of my
Commitment Ceremony °7 with my partner completing this writing
300. Id. at 1107.
301. See Oklahoma v. Post. 479 U.S. 890 (1986) (denying certiorari).
302. See generally Bowers, 478 U.S. at 200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority
obsessively focused on homosexual sexual activity even though the Georgia statute in question
had broad, sweeping language that applied to heterosexuals as well).
303. SeROBSON, supra note 170, at 47.
304. SeeRoBSON, supra note 170, at 47.
305. SeeROBSON, supra note 170, at 47.
306. SeeLORDE, supra note 168, at 53.
307. Reminiscent of the disrespect afforded the relationships between African-originated
people during slavery and the outright illegality of bi-racial relationships in the United States as
late as the 1960s, committed relationships between two people of the same gender is not legal
in any state in the United States. Nonetheless, because of our love for each other, our com-
mitment to a long-term relationship, and our devotion to our children, we designed a ceremony
to express the joy of our obligation and commitment to each other. We invited family and
friends to join us, not only to witness as we voiced the terms of our bond, but also to add their
promise of support to the maintenance of that bond.
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project about sodomy is both ironic and taxing. I want to say "fuck
sodomy" and get on with the work of living, much the same as I want
to say "fluck racism," or gender oppression, or ageism, but of course,
addressing these forms of oppression is the work of living at this
time, in this place. Yet, how can something so vaguely defined as
sodomy infiltrate our daily living so completely and demand such at-
tention? What right did a sodomy law have to invade Hardwick's
Georgia bedroom? What empowers this broadly written, arguably
misapplied, Georgia sodomy statute? What confers on it the author-
ity to crowd into my Ohio home and stand shoulder to shoulder with
twenty-two other equally uncouth state statutes?HG The absence of
statutes in twentseven states since 1961,3 seems to have less value for
our safety from the onslaught of the force of law.
Regardless of how the law tries to apply these statutes to lesbians
and regardless of what Ruthann Robson calls them, my lesbian part-
ner tells me "[w]e lesbians are anatomically unsuited for these laws,
so we should not apply them to ourselves. We don't do sodomyl Do
we?" "And besides," she continued, "they ought to reward us for all
of the work we lesbians are doing - exploring and creating healthier
relationships - healthier families. These heterosexual families were
in pretty bad shape until they started picking up on some of the
ideas we've been talking, teaching, learning about, and working
through for all these years. You know? We're working hard and
helping out."10
According to Robson, the existing criminal sodomy statutes fall
into at least one of three categories. First, the oral/anal category
criminalizes sexual behavior involving sexual organs (genitals) and
these body parts.311 It is unclear whether behavior involving mouth
and mammaries fits under these statutes, because breasts may not be
categorized as sexual organs within the meaning of the statutes.
Lesbian sexual expression is unwieldy under this category.
12
Because the second category relies on presuppositions and as-
sumptions for meaning, Robson designates it "natural."1 Laws un-
der this category bear descriptors such as "crime against nature,"
808. See The Regulation of Lesbian and Gay Sexuality, in LESBIANS, GAYMEN, AND THE LAW, su-
pra note 23, at 80 (listing the twenty-three states that still maintain sodomy laws).
309. See The Regulation of Lesbian and Gay Suality, in LESBIANS, GAYMEN, AND THE LAW, supra
note 23, at 87.
310. Interview with Amina Mary Ostendorf, in Beachwood, Ohio (Aug. 1, 1996) (following
Ostendorfs reading of an early draft of this paper and during a discussion at our kitchen table).
311. SeeROBSON, supra note 170, at 48.
312. SeeROBSON, supranote 170, at48.
313. &eROBSON, supra note 170, at 48.
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"abominable and detestable crime against nature," or "the infamous
crime against nature."14 This category of law is inefficient because
the vague descriptors make their elements difficult to prove in a
court of law. Although these laws are insufficient and inefficient,
many courts, including the United States Supreme Court, have up-
held such statutes from constitutional vagueness attacks by reasoning
that our common understanding includes knowledge of what such
statutes prohibit, or that, even if common knowledge is not so defi-
nite, judges interpreting the statute can rely on established legal un-
derstandings. 3
316The third category of sex statutes is gender specific. These stat-
utes may be the most harsh in relation to lesbian sexual expression.
These statutes have same-sex prohibitions which may be combined
with references to either one or both of the other aforementioned
categories. Also, according to Robson, this category of statutes often
prohibits sexual contact with animals.3 17
These categories refer to criminal statutes. There are few reported
cases involving consenting adults and even fewer cases involving les-
bians.
After reviewing the last several paragraphs of my draft, my lesbian
friend remarked, "See, one case. Robson cited only one case since
1968' - I told you these laws aren't made for us. Do you think I
could go to jail for sniffing your armpits? I love to sniff your armpits.
The joys of lesbian sex. They just don't know what they're are miss-
ing."20 We laugh, hug, and touch no sex organs. "[T]here was a
time, not long ago and not yet over, in which we, men meant we
adult white male Europeans, carnivorous and capable of sacrifice." 2
DAHMER=
I, I, I, I really love your culture, it's
it's, it's, it's so rich and, and, and, lush
and, and, and dark
I, I, I, I really lovER your culture - it's
314. See ROBSON, supra note 170, at 48.
315. See ROBSON, supra note 170, at 48.
316. See ROBSON, supra note 170, at 48.
317. SeeROBSON, supra note 170, at 48.
318. See ROBSON, supra note 170, at 49.
319. See ROBSON, supra note 170, at 49-50 (discussing People v. Livermore, 155 N.W.2d 711,
712 (Mich Ct. App. 1968)).
320. See supra note 310, and accompanying text.
321. SeeDerrida, supra note 212, at 18.
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you know, It's well, at least YOU know your
roots, your roots, your roots
IfI knew my roots, IfI KNEW my roots, IfI knew my roots
knew my rooooots I'd work'em IfI knew my roots I'd work'em
I'd work 'em on You
IfI knew My Roots, I'd work 'em on you on you on you
generic that's what i am a little of this little of that
german english french indian in there somewhere in there some-
where
I don't know I don't know i don't know
I'm drawn to - to - to - to - to
I've always been drawn to, been drawn to been drawn to
beendrawn - drawn - drawn - too
DRAW ME NEARER NEARER BLESSED LORD
TO THE PLACE WHERE
THOU HAST DIED
Ijust want to keep -just want to keep
Ijust want to keep you -just want-to
just want -just you -just us -just us
justice? just us - us - us - us
keep you Ijust want to keep you
with me always - always
All ways - All ways
I didn't MEAN you any harm. not mean - not mean
no harm no harm
no?
harm?
no! nolNol
Harm!
Justice?
just us
DRAW ME NEARER NEARER BLESSED LORD
TO THE PLACE WHERE
THOU HAST DIED
IfI knew my roots, I'd work 'em on youl
Jeffrey said he "(J] ust wanted to keep them with [him] always. " "
322. See Derrida, supra note 212, at 18 (quoting a televised interview with Dahmer after his
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So, he tried to make zombies. PoorJeffrey, what's a fellah to do?
Some friends just don't know how to be there for you -
how to behave.
So, Jeffrey Dahmer took the skulls of HIS black friends
with him to work
and kept them
in his locker
at hisjob
in the CHOCOLATE FACTORY.
And I wonder,
where do you take your colored friends?5s
In light of Jeffrey Dahmner's actions, privacy alone cannot be the
answer, the resolution, the solution to our dilemma.2 4 After all, was
it not Dahmer's privacy or property rights that urged the police offi-
cers to ignore or threaten those Black women who valiantly called
upon them to save that Laotian boy's life?s5
Within the interdependence of mutual (nondominant) differences
lies that security which enables us to descend into the chaos of
knowledge and return with true visions of our future, along with
the concomitant power to effect those changes which can bring
that future into being. Difference is that raw and powerful connec-
tion from which our personal power is forged.28
Privacy, Prerogative, and Privilege
In order to have a comprehensive deconstruction of sodomy, one
must also deconstruct the primary weapon used against sodomy laws
- the doctrine of privacy. The term privacy has an amorphic identity
that brings as much as, or more, confusion to some as sodomy itself.
Nevertheless, the privacy doctrine is invoked with heated reverence
by libertarians and constitutional scholars in most discourses on sex-
ual or reproductive autonomy. Like most expressions, privacy brings
with it certain presuppositions about the interaction of humans and
their sociopolitical environment - presuppositions that are not nec-
conviction). See also Stern, infra note 324.
323. See HUFF, Dahmerites, in BLACK LESBIANS Do NOT EXIST, supra note 1, at 40-41. My
mother, Madeline Bowden, coined the term "dahmerites" to signify social/cultural leaches.
324. Jeffrey Dahmer is a convicted serial killer who murdered 17 young males over 13 years.
Andrew Stern, The Blood-Curdling Tate ofDahmer, ROCKYMTN. NEWS, Dec. 4, 1994, at 12A.
325. Police left a drugged and naked Laotian boy with Dahmer after Dahmer claimed the
boy was his lover, was drunk, and had wandered outside. Dahmer later killed the boy. Anthony
Shadid, Cops'Firing Upheld in Dahmer Case CHI. SUN-TIMES, Nov. 28,1992, at 4.
326. AUDRE LORDE, SISTER OUTSIDER 111-12 (1984).
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essarily true for all groups in the United States, but nevertheless, are
accepted as universal truisms. Because the privacy concept is used so
often in the debate over sodomy laws and gay rights, it behooves us
to examine the merits of privacy as a proper sociopolitical strategy of
liberation and legal victory. This section examines all of these fac-
tors, while ultimately concluding that better strategies may exist for
fighting sodomy laws. 27
A. PRVACY, PUBLIC HATRED, AND MR. HARD WICK
While Menriam-Webster defines privacy with many meanings, includ-
ing "seclusion," "secrecy," "personal matter," and "a place of seclu-
sion or retreat,"sa the highest significance is not found on dictionary
pages, but in the minds of discourse participants and legal arbiters.
Whatever the precise definition is that floats in human minds, most
individuals probably think of some sort of arena in which informa-
tion and/or deeds are closed off from view, secluded, and beyond
reproach.
Presuppositions of privacy doctrine include tenets of classical lib-
eralism that are held to be universal truths. Namely, there are arenas
such as home, bed, and property, whose sacredness place them
above scrutiny. Secondly, arenas designated as private are presumed
to be safe space for all participants therein. Thirdly, individuals in
such private arenas are presumed to be autonomous and acting of
their free will. Finally, there is a philosophical and moral wall be-
tween public and private space that prevents either from influencing
the other.
As applied to the circumstances of Bowers v. Hardwick, nearly all
such presumptions are capable of passing analysis. For example,
Hardwick and his partner were apparently autonomous individuals
who freely chose to engage in a consensual act-and no doubt em-
braced Hardwick's bedroom as a safe place to perform that act. Yet,
the philosophical wall that presupposes the mutual exclusion of
Hardwick's bedroom and his public life slowly disintegrates upon
close examination of the facts of his case.
The salient facts of Bowers v. Hardwick are discussed earlier.529
However, certain facts bear mentioning when analyzing the alleged
public/private schism here. Michael Hardwick's problems with the
police officer did not begin in has bedroom; they began in spaces
popularly designated as public, that is, the street outside a gay bar
327. Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Pnivacy Pindpe, 92 COLUM. L. Rrv. 1431, 1436 (1992).
328. WEBSTER'sTiRD NEv INTE.RNATiONAL DICTIONARY 1804 (1993).
329. &e supra pages 8-15.
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and in the holding cell, where homophobic abuse was perpetrated
upon him under color of state authority.3 3 0 It was public homophobia
and societal oppression that enabled police to legitimize abuse by
private individuals, as well as by the police themselves. It can be said
that, but for the public homophobia enacted upon Hardwick, he
would not have found himself being taunted in a holding cell for os-
tensibly private behavior.
A more unified account of the events that preceded and followed
the encounter in Hardwick's bedroom moves toward a broader con-
ception of our analytic object than the privacy principle permits.
These events do not simply straddle the boundaries between the
public and private - they overrun them altogether."3
That having been said, it is rhetorically incorrect to construct the
issues in Bowers v. Hardwick as purely privacy interests. One is
prompted to question whether privacy doctrine did not adequately
confront and/or deconstruct state-endorsed homophobia, or which
systems of domination it effectively deconstructed? For whom are
the universalized norms of doctrinal privacy actually true? If true for
only a few, then how has privacy benefited marginalized groups in
United States society?
B. PRIVATEPRILEGE; PRIVATE PAN
To most civil libertarians, the doctrine of privacy has been a boon
to fighters of inequality and oppression. Yet, a close examination of
legal history yields many instances in which it was the privacy doc-
trine that enforced public hierarchies and private oppression-and
was not the sword of liberation many people now perceive it to be.
In many instances, the presumptions of autonomy and private space
as safe space pathetically shielded the harsh reality that the person
who really had the autonomy in private space was the one with more
public power-the one with more money, with masculine sex organs,
and with lighter skin.
This dilemma was more than apparent to an African-American
man named Irvis, who was refused service at a private all-white Moose
Lodge.s In 1972, when his legal challenge reached the Supreme
Court, the great privacy doctrine reared its head to uphold the status
quo.33 Like his ancestors before him whose autonomy was sacrificed
by slaveholders insisting on their right to do as they please with pri-
330. See Irons, supra note 32, at 128.
331. SeeThomas, supra note 327, at 1442.
332. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
333. Id. at 179.
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vate property, Irvis was faced with a Supreme Court that recognized
white privacy as paramount-with the blessing of the Pennsylvania
Liquor Board, a decidedly public entity.'3 Recognizing that the ma-
jority averted the discourse from racism to private autonomy, in his
dissent, Justice Douglas stated that "a black Pennsylvanian suffers
cognizable injury, when the State supports and encourages the main-
tenance of a system of segregated fraternal organizations ... .s"
Thus, regardless of the de facto support of racism by the State, the
injury was swept under the rhetoric of privacy: private clubs and
(white) autonomy.
Just as the public/private split has played a large role in racist op-
pression, many feminist lawyers, including Catharine MacKinnon
and RuthAnn Robson, have drawn attention to the experiential dif-
ference that doctrinal privacy has for men and women. For women,
the presuppositions of privacy doctrine have almost never been true.
In Feminism Unmodified s1 6 MacKinnon states
[buy staying out of marriage and the family, prominently meaning
sexuality - that is to say, heterosexuality ... the law of privacy pro-
poses to guarantee individual bodily integrity, personal intimacy.
But if one asks if women s rights to these values have been guaran-
teed, it appears that the law of privacy works to translate traditional
social values into the rhetoric of individual rights as a means of
subordinating those rights to specific social imperatives.
And sure enough, the privacy doctrine has protected all manner of
assaults against women's Additionally, women's bodies are splayed
everywhere for public consumption in advertising, the mass media,
and pornography, thereby making it less likely for women to find the
elusive privacy that white heterosexual men seem to possess.
Advocates of privacy doctrine may quickly point out the gains that
privacy doctrine has brought to women via the decision in Roe v.
Wade, which offered a privacy-engendered guarantee to abortion
rights.3 While the Supreme Court decision .in Roe is beneficial, in
that it purports to promote women's reproductive control, the rea-
soning used to reach the decision is not beneficial. Once reproduc-
tive privacy was granted to women by the Court, the presuppositions
334. Id. at 177.
335. Id. at 183 n.4 (Douglas and MarshaUl, ., dissenting).
336. CATHARINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987).
337. Id. at 96-97.
338. See Ruthann Robson, Cimes of Lesbian Sex, in LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE LAW, sUpra
note 23, at 82-87.
339. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
340. Id. at 153-54.
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of privacy doctrine returned in an ominous fashion a mere eight
years later in Harris v. McRae.34' After the 1976 Congress restricted
reimbursement to States for abortions for low income women under
the Medicaid healthcare program, indigent pregnant women and
others brought suit seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the Hyde
Amendment,342 so that impecunious women could actually exercise
their right to choose as provided by the Roe decision.m The Court
ruled that, even in cases in which a physician deemed it medically
necessary to complete an abortion, the Hyde Amendment contra-
vened neither the patient's nor the doctor's constitutional rights;
nor does it require that a State supplement funds for the purpose of
facilitating abortions since the Hyde Amendment restricts federal
funds for that purpose.3" Congress' Hyde Amendment derails indi-
gent women's opportunity to act on choice regarding an unwanted
or medically unsound pregnancy. M The Supreme Court rational-
ized, justified, and authorized the Amendment through the privacy
doctrine.m The Court told women that in the reproductive sphere,
long since designated as private, we women were all "autonomous."'47
Reproductive autonomy is a proposition that low-income women
may find laughable. The Court voiced the deceptively benevolent
desire to stay out of a "private" decision while averting its eyes from
the intersectionality of sex and economic oppression that placed the
plaintiffs before them.
341. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
342. The Hyde Amendment prohibits "the use of federal funds to reimburse the cost of
abortions under the Medicaid program except under certain circumstances." Id. at 302.
343. Id. at 312.
344. Id. at 326.
345. Id. at 316.
346. See McRae, 448 U.S. at 314-15.
347. See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (recognizing a woman's right to terminate her preg-
nancy).
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c. DOCTRINAL ALTATIVFS
To such criticism of privacy doctrine, opponents of sodomy laws
may be prompted to ask, if not privacy, then what doctrine can be
used?
Justice Powell's Bowers v. Hardwick concurrence promoted the al-
ternative of using an Eighth Amendmente challenge premised on
the idea that twenty years in prison for one instance of oral or anal
sex is "cruel and unusual punishment."39 However, such a challenge
fails to confront the illegitimacy of punishing sodomy between con-
senting adults with any prison sentence, whether it is one, five, or
twenty years.
A more substantive Eighth Amendment analysis can be used, and
has been proposed by Professor Kendall Thomas, who calls it a
"corporal integrity approach" to sodomy laws. Unlike traditional
privacy doctrine, Thomas' approach ensconces protection of bodily
integrity and autonomy without presupposing over-extensive truisms
about particular arenas. Thomas explains that this approach has
more than one use because
The Eighth Amendment prohibitions against cruel and unusual
punishments may be construed not only to forbid open and official
use of government use of violence to enforce the criminal laws
against homosexual sodomy, but also to bar a state from effecting
the enforcement of these laws by instigating, encouraging, or per-
mitting private attacks on gay men and lesbians.
When bolstered by a Fourth Amendmente 2 challenge for invasion
of one's person, the corporal integrity approach may adequately con-
front what privacy doctrine cannot.
D. ANADMONITION
All of the aforementioned points should serve as a reminder to
lesbigay communities about the merits of close re-examination of
privacy doctrine. This is especially true with the emergence of the
North American Man-Boy Love Association (NAMBLA),ssS which in-
348. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflided." U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII (emphasis added).
349. &eBowers, 478 U.S. at 197-98 (Powell,J., concurring).
350. SeeThomas, supra note 327, at 1487.
351. SeeThomas, supra note 327, at 1487.
352. "The tight of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ... P U.S. CONST. amend. IV
(emphasis added).
353. NAMBLA is a "San Francisco-based group that advocates sexual relationships between
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yokes privacy and autonomy rhetoric in order to rationalize adult
sexual activity with children.J It is also true when one realizes the
degree to which lesbigay people of color - are turned away from the
doors of private, elite gay dance clubs, as well as in the situations in
which couples desire to use a (usually poor) woman's uterus for sur-
rogate parenting.
Privacy and its illusion of universal autonomy within certain
spheres or arenas continues to further hierarchies of power no less
within the lesbigay community than in heterosexual community.
This dilemma renders a critique of privacy, safety, and oppression all
the more urgent. Only when this reexamination occurs will lesbigay
communities be able to decide whether it is wise for lesbigays to
kneel at the altar of privacy doctrine without inquiring who owns the
church.
A DECONSTRUGTIVE CONCLUSION
we have chosen each other
and the edge of each other s battles
the war is the same
if we lose
someday women s blood will congeal
upon a dead planet
if we win
there is no tellings"
There is no telling because justice is to be. That is, justice is fi-
ture-oriented. Justice shines like a light at the end of a tunnel when
all concerned parties speaking the same language, having considered
our history, the laws, our perspective, come to the point of judg-
ment. At that non-chronological moment when justice requires
change, we no longer stand on mere history, but instead we re-
commit judgment afresh in order to strive toward justice with no
guarantee of success. I have said that deconstruction is a strategy for
reading and writing text that re-works the margins and the centers,
and offers the possibility ofjustice somewhere.
This paper is a result of my creative efforts,57 offered to the reader
[male) adults and boys." Glen Martin, S.F. Man Held in Sex Assault on VYrginia Boy, SAN
FRANcisco CHRON., Sept. 5, 1996, A22.
354. For the Reord, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Sept. 22, 1992, at C4.
355. I have settled on the use of the term "people of color" - albeit inadequate for its elu-
siveness, illusiveness, and divisiveness -until I find another, more fitting term.
356. SeeLORDE, supra note 168, at 13.
Spring 1997]
JOURNAL OF GENDER & THE LAW
with appropriate humility and audacity, to stir the jurisprudential
cauldron. I have added my particular and disparate sociopolitical,
racial, gender-referenced, sexual-oriented, economic, and spiritual
ingredients to the pot as I stir it with my varied feminist sensibilities.
I have used my newly-found and well-worn talents and resources to
call forth sufficient as&" to begin this task. I have conjured up a
support system to guide us toward completion of this leg of our
journey.59
As the title implies, I invite you all to the process of deconstruction
that you have already begun.
Because justice requires it, I persist.
357. I want to thank Dean Steven Smith for encouraging me to continue to speak and act on
what I believe. I want to thank Professor Mark E. Wojcik, Conference Chair, for having the
courage, commitment, patience, and power to convene such a transformative gathering. I offer
special heartfelt appreciation to Professor Beverly Pyle for encouraging me to "go for itl" and
for being my friend even when the Bluebook was not. I also thank Amina for deconstructing in-
timacy with me and keeping me company along the path.
358. As6 is a Yortbfi devotional word for the life force that is present in everything; every-
thing that is is alive with as6, which is a functional, focusable power used to make change hap-
pen. Yorntbd people are native to Southwestern Nigeria, Togo, and other West African nations,
however, risi worship is worldwide.
359. I called upon EGUN (our ancestors), Audre Lorde, Bill Kuntsler, Mabel Hampton, and
Michael Hardwick, and other brave souls for guidance, forjustice's sake.
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